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Abstract
The purpose of this work is to examine the present structure of the U.S. health
care reform debate and how medical privacy rights should be incorporated into it.
This work examines the hypothesis, "Present health care reform proposals must be
changed in order to protect medical privacy rights adequately." In this work, the
term "medical privacy" refers to the interest patients have in restricting disclosure of
information gathered about them in the process of their receiving health care. First,
we look at three specific motivations behind U.S. health care reform: reducing cost,
improving quality, and increasing access to services. The importance of information
technology to each of these concerns is examined, and subsequently, medical privacy
is discussed as an additional area in which health care reform is needed. The cur-
rent legal status of medical privacy in the U.S. is also explored. Accordingly, two
relevant Federal cases are examined, Whalen v. Roe (429 U.S. 589 (U.S. Supreme
Court 1977)) and U.S. v. Westinghouse (638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980)). Medical
privacy is discussed as a social good which must be balanced against other consider-
ations, such as the interests of insurance companies, employers, researchers, doctors,
hospitals, law enforcement officials, and government agencies. Finally, three health
care reform plans presently before Congress are evaluated on how well they plan to
protect medical privacy: President Clinton's proposed National Health Security Act
(H.R.3600 / S.1757), Rep. Cooper's Managed Competition Act (H.R.3222 / S.1579),
and Sen. Nickles's Consumer Choice Health Security Act (H.R.3698 / S.1743). Eval-
uation criteria include the recommendations of scholars in the field as well as the
1973 Fair Information guidelines given by the U.S. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. The following four conclusions are made: present legislative action to
protect medical privacy is needed, legislative proposals protecting medical privacy
should be as specific as possible, an existing agency should have the authority over
privacy standards, and vigorous state implementation of medical privacy standards
is also necessary.
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Title: Lecturer, Technology and Policy Program
Acknowledgments
This thesis is dedicated to my loving and generous family: my parents, Bob and
Sandy Atchison, my sister Andrea, and my grandparents, Bob and Katie Atchison,
and James and Van Hoover. I thank my family for always loving me and supporting
me. You guys are the best! You show me what love really is.
I am grateful to my thesis advisor Lee McKnight for his helpful discussions and
comments. It was great to learn about policy from you.
Because truth must storm the heart as well as the head, a person should never
separate academics from the life. Thanks Noel, for helping me keep on learning
this. Your character and sense of humor have strengthened me during my time here.
Thanks for all the sanity you let me borrow from you. You have been my true friend.
It is very encouraging how are differences enable us to sharpen each other.
One of life's vibrant joys is to experience true community. Thoughout my time in
Boston, I have been surrounded with friendship. Thanks to Dale, and the Polcyns,
Adam and Amy, for all the refreshing lunch talks. Shane and Jee Hoon, you guys
were great lunchtime pals, too. A special thanks to Amy Black for organizing the
"thesisizing" proofreading/celebration party. Thanks to everyone there who helped
me polish my prose. You were a big help. For helpful information, I thank my friends
Kevin Hodge, Michael Jacknis, Tom Lee, Pat Lynch, and Kevin Twit. Thanks to
the original "Senators" group in the TPP Proseminar: Rob, Kristine, and Don. You
guys made Technology and Policy an unforgettable experience of warmth, challenge,
and fun. I am indebted to Park Street Church, Seekers, and Graduate Christian
Fellowship for providing the environment that linked me to many of these special
people. Thanks to all the people, including Margaret and the Wednesday night guys,
who prayed for me to finish this thing.
Because "The Simpsons" is a show best savored with friends, I thank Chad: "How
'bout that! I looked something up! These books behind me don't just make the office
look good. They're filled with useful legal tidbits..." (Lionel Hutz, Attorney-at-law).
Thanks, Matt for being such a listening ear and for making me define my terms.
3
Thanks, Joel, for your brilliant advice on tack extraction.
For generously contributing funds that allowed me to have this special experi-
ence at MIT, I would also like to thank the Beinecke Foundation, the Alfred Keil
Fellowship for the Wiser Uses of Technology, Charles and Constance Stokes, and my
grandmother, Van Hoover.
Lastly and most importantly, it is my hope that my work and my life demonstrate
that Jesus Christ is alive, majestic, and full of mercy for those who come to Him.
Jesus, you are humanity's only true hope, and I owe you absolutely everything. I was
lost in despair before I met you. Thank you for releasing me from the trap of my own
arrogance and selfishness and for continually showering me with meaning, healing,
and love. Thank you for being so reliable through this thesis and during my entire
time in Boston. The desparate condition of the world shows how much we all need
the rich compassion you offer us: "This is how God showed his love among us: He
sent his one and only Son into the world that we might live through him" (I John
4:9). Thank you for who you are.
4
Contents
1 Motivations for U.S. Health Care Reform 8
1.1 The Scope of this Work .......................... 8
1.2 Is There a National Health Care Crisis? ......... . .... . 9
1.3 Cost .................................... 10
1.3.1 Total Spending Levels ..................... ......... . 10
1.3.2 Rise over Time in GDP Expenditure .............. 10
1.3.3 GDP Expenditure Compared to Other Countries ...... . . 11
1.3.4 Possible Explanations ....................... 11
1.3.5 Public and Private Reactions to Rising Costs ........... . 14
1.3.6 Cost Reduction and Information Technology ............. . 15
1.3.7 Cost Planning and Information Technology .......... .... . 16
1.4 Quality ............................................. 17
1.4.1 Minority Health Outcomes . .................. 17
1.4.2 Health Outcomes Compared to Other Countries ....... .. . 18
1.4.3 Quality and Information Technology .............. 19
1.5 Access to Services . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.1 Access and the Uninsured ............................ . 21
1.5.2 The Economics of the Insurance Industry ............ 22
1.5.3 Two Competing Views of Justice ............... ....... . 24
1.5.4 Two Visions of Community .................. ........ . 24
1.5.5 Actuarial Fairness and Information Technology ....... .. . 29
1.5.6 The Solidarity Principle and Information Technology .... . 31
5
1.6 The Need for Medical Privacy Reform..
1.7 The Relevance of Medical Privacy ....
1.8 Survey of Chapters ...........
2 Medical Privacy and Current U.S. Law
2.1 Term s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Philosophical Considerations ...........
2.2.1 Ethics ...................
2.2.2 Privacy in General ...........
2.2.3 Computers and Privacy .........
2.2.4 Medical Privacy ..............
2.3 General Privacy and U.S. Law ..........
2.3.1 The Right of Privacy in Tort Law ....
2.3.2 A Note about Tort Law .........
2.3.3 The Right of Privacy and Constitutional
2.3.4 Various Interests to Be Balanced ....
2.3.5 The Relevance of Court Cases ......
2.3.6 Court Case #1: Whalen v. Roe ....
2.3.7 Court Case #2: U.S. v. Westinghouse .
38
. . . . . . . . . . . . .38
................ .39
. . . . . . . . . . . . 39
. . . . . . . . . . . . .40
. . . . . . . . . . . . .43
. . . . . . . . . . . . .45
. . . . . . . . . . . . .45
. . . . . . . . . . . . .46
. . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Law ........ . 47
. . . . . . . . . . . . .48
. . . . . . . . . . . . .51
. . . . . . . . . . . . 51
. . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3.8 Implications of These Cases: Balance of Powers and Balance of
Interests .............................
3 Medical Privacy and Three Health Care Reform Proposals
3.1 Evaluation Criteria ........................
3.1.1 National Scope ......................
3.1.2 The "Fair Information Practices" .............
3.1.3 The Gostin Group's Five Recommendations ......
3.1.4 The Gostin Group's Three Goals ............
3.2 Democrats, Reform, and Privacy ................
3.3 The Clinton Plan .........................
3.3.1 Summary of the Clinton Health Care Plan .......
6
32
34
36
60
62
63
63
63
64
65
67
67
67
................
................
................
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
3.3.2 Privacy and the Clinton Plan
3.4 The Cooper Plan ...........
3.4.1 Summary of the Cooper Plan
3.4.2 Privacy and the Cooper Plan
3.5 Republicans, Reform, and Privacy . .
3.6 The Nickles Plan ..........
3.6.1 Summary of the Nickles Plan
3.6.2 Privacy and the Nickles Plan
4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Medical Privacy Reform
4.1 Recommendation #1: Present Congressional Action Is Needed . . .
4.1.1 Present versus Future Action .................
4.1.2 Legislative versus Other Types of Action ...........
4.2 Recommendation #2: Specific Proposals Are Needed ........
4.3 Recommendation #3: An Existing Agency Should Have Authority.
4.4 Recommendation #4: Vigorous State Implementation Is Necessary
4.5 Conclusion. ...............................
Bibliography
7
. . . . . . . . . . 6 9
. . . . . . . . . . 7 4
. . . . . . . . . . 7 4
. . . . . . . . . . 7 5
. . . . . . . . . . 7 8
. . . . . . . . . . 7 9
. . . . . . . . . . 7 9
. . . . . . . . . . 7 9
82
83
83
83
83
84
84
85
87
Chapter 1
Motivations for U.S. Health Care
Reform
1.1 The Scope of this Work
The purpose of this work is to examine the present structure of the health care reform
debate and to discuss how medical privacy ought to be incorporated into it. This work
is an examination of the hypothesis: "Present health care reform proposals must be
changed in order to protect medical privacy rights adequately." In this work, the
term "medical privacy" refers to the interest patients have in restricting disclosure of
information gathered about them in the process of their receiving health care. The
work culminates with an evaluation of three health care reform bills currently before
Congress on how well they protect medical privacy. In this first chapter, however,
the debate over national health care reform in the United States will be discussed in
general terms. Three main issues of that debate will be examined: cost, quality, and
access. The effect of information technology on each of these issues will be highlighted.
Then reasons will be given why medical privacy is an additional important issue
in the debate. It will be shown that medical privacy plays an important part in
considerations of cost, quality, and access and that these other issues can imply trade-
offs against medical privacy. Furthermore, without careful consideration of medical
privacy in health care reform, damages to the welfare of the public could result.
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1.2 Is There a National Health Care Crisis?
The policy debate over the reform of the nation's health care system reform has
brought out the question of whether reform is necessary. Is changing the nation's
health care system necessary, or is the status quo acceptable? Though this is a
question that could be easily forgotten amid enthusiasm over new projects, it is one
that ought to be fundamental to the debate. Irwin Stelzer points this out:
Lost in all of this [attention to the details of the various reform plans] has
been the large question of whether a massive transformation of our health-
care system is in truth either necessary or desirable. And discussion of
that question has been inhibited, and even for all purposes silenced, by the
fact that the main participants in the debate-the politicians-have, for
fear of seeming callous, accepted the unexamined assumptions that there
is a great "crisis" in health care, and that our system is radically flawed
and desperately needs to be overhauled.1
This conclusion seems plausible, but whether one agrees with it or not, it is reasonable
to examine whether reform is necessary before changing the system. Furthermore,
one's view of the status quo-the nature and extent of its failings-directly influences
one's views of the best possible solutions. It is not within the scope of the present
work to answer the larger question of whether or not reform is necessary. The purpose
of this work is to examine the present structure of the health care reform debate and
to discuss how medical privacy ought to be incorporated into it. From this standpoint,
it is important to understand the motivations behind the push for U.S. health care
reform in order to see where medical privacy fits in.
The question of whether reform is necessary has often been framed as "Is there a
health care crisis in America?" The word "crisis" can be a vague word which inspires
emotion instead of rigorous thought. The term must be defined in order to be analyzed
intelligently. Typically, the word "crisis" in the present debate refers to a variety of
concerns about the nature of America's health care system. These concerns involve
at least the following three issues: the cost of American health care, its quality, and
the accessibility of its services. There is also some concern about medical privacy in
'Irwin M. Stelzer, "What Health-Care Crisis?" Commentary (Feb. 1994): 19.
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the present system. Medical privacy should be included when discussing the other
reform issues because, as this chapter will show, medical privacy is involved in each
of them. The rest of this chapter will discuss three issues: cost, quality, and access;
showing the relation of each to information technology. Then, medical privacy will
be considered as an additional issue important to health care reform. Its importance
to the full reform debate will be described.
1.3 Cost
1.3.1 Total Spending Levels
One of the major reasons that health care reform is at the top of the American policy
agenda is cost. Suzanne Letsch researched health care spending levels through 1991.
In 1991, health expenditures in the United States rose to $751.8 billion. Averaged
over the population, this represents $2,868 per person. This total level was an 11.4
percent increase from the 1990 level, an increase four times the growth rate of the
economy in 1991. In 1990, the growth rate of health care spending was similar, 11.7
percent.
1.3.2 Rise over Time in GDP Expenditure
More than the total level of health expenditures, there is concern about health care
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The concern is that health
care is taking a growing share of national monetary resources which might be better
used elsewhere. Health care comprises around one seventh of the nation's economy.
The 1991 level was 13.2 percent of America's GDP, up from 12.2 percent in 1991, the
largest increase in GDP percentage in over three decades. In 1960, the percentage was
only 5.3. The increase each year in national health spending as a share of GDP has
been growing since 1988, when it grew 0.2 percentage points. It continued to grow
2 Suzanne W. Letsch, "National Health Care Spending in 1991," Health Affairs (Spring 1993):
94-95.
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by 0.7 points in 1991 and 1.0 points in 1991.3 In the popular media, the same idea
of spending growth is communicated. Newsweek reports, "Between 1965 and 1991,
health spending rose from 5.9 to 13.2 percent of GDP. If unchecked it could hit 20
percent in a decade."4
1.3.3 GDP Expenditure Compared to Other Countries
As of 1991, the United States spent a greater percentage of its GDP on health care
than all other industrialized countries.5 The following table gives a few specific
comparisons:6
The concern is that such disparities is rendering
in the global marketplace.
the United States less competitive
1.3.4 Possible Explanations
At least four possible explanations are given for the rise in health care expenditures
as a share of GDP. They are the following: weak economic growth, technological
advance, consumers' insulation from responsibility, and waste and bureaucracy.
Weak Economic Growth When the share of the GDP taken up by health care
spending increases, it means that health care spending is growing faster than the
3Ibid.
4Robert J. Samuelson, "How We Got Into This Mess," Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1993, 31.
5Ibid., 32.
6Ibid.
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Percentage
Country GDP Spent on
Health Care in 1991
United States 13.2
France 9.1
Germany 8.5
United Kingdom 6.6
economy as a whole. According to Letsch, the primary reason for the trend of increases
in the percentage of GDP devoted to health care is weak economic growth. The
average annual increase in GDP from 1960 to 1990 was 8.2 percent, but in 1991 the
GDP grew only 2.8 percent, the slowest growth rate since 1960.7
Technological Advance Most Americans are satisfied with the quality of the
health care they receive. According to Stelzer, 80 percent of Americans report that
they are either "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with their own health care in terms of
quality and cost.8 In fact, in some ways American medicine is a victim of its successes.
High technology has saved innumerable lives, improved the lives of others, and has
given most Americans the quality of health care that they want. However, using this
technology can be very expensive, and the way that the present system makes deci-
sions about incurring these costs is now being questioned. In the research of Joseph
Newhouse, after accounting for various causes of increases in medical spending, he
was left with a large residual. He writes, "To me, the most plausible candidate [for
explaining the large residual] is the enhanced capabilities of medicine."9 He argues
that rises in health care spending have not come primarily from an increase in the
number of people utilizing medical services-these have remained relatively stable
since 1960-but rather from more spending per person served. Increased technology
would explain this increase because, independent of the number of people served,
increased technology will lead, on average, to a more expensive patient-day. 0l°
Consumers' Insulation from Responsibility According to Letsch, an increasing
proportion of health cost is paid for by third parties." This is significant because as
the contribution to payment from consumers decreases, they have less incentive to
purchase responsibly. She writes:
7Letsch, 94-95.
8Stelzer, 19.
9Joseph P. Newhouse, "An Inconoclastic View of Health Care Cost Containment," Health Affairs
(Supplement 1993): 162.
1
°Ibid.
1 Letsch, 95-96. See also section 1.3.5 on page 14 below.
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When consumers share only modestly in paying for their health care, they
become insulated from its true price, thereby compromising the ability
of the marketplace to set prices that reflect societal value. Third party
payment weakens consumers' incentives to be economical in making health
care purchases. 12
Thus, the lower proportion of cost paid by consumers lessens their ability to consume
in a socially responsible way. Moreover, complexity is another cause of insulation
from responsibility for health consumption decisions. Letsch writes, "because of the
complexity of today's health care system, most consumers lack the knowledge they
need to make treatment decisions."'3 This complexity is both administrative and
technological. Letsch writes:
Similarly, providers of health care can sometimes increase technology (and
therefore costs) without careful consideration of the usefulness of the treat-
ment or procedure when compared with lower priced alternatives.14
Waste and Bureaucracy Another suspected cause of high health care costs is
inefficiency. The concern is that paperwork occupies too much of the time that doc-
tors should be spending with patients. According to Newsweek, "There are claim
forms for 1,300 insurers and constant feuds over bills."' 5 Many believe that the high
and uncertain damages paid in malpractice suits lead doctors to practice "defensive
medicine"-excessive testing to protect themselves from liability.16 Malpractice pre-
miums for doctors average about 5 percent of revenues.17 Likewise, in general, some
believe that many procedures are unnecessary. In addition, doctors and pharmaceu-
tical companies are often accused of making excessive profits. 18 Practicing medicine
in the traditional way, on a fee-for-service basis, gives doctors an incentive to perform
as many procedures as possible. On the other hand, "capitation" is a reimbursement
system that rewards doctors based on the number of patients they serve. Capitation
12Ibid., 108.
13Ibid., 108-109.
14Ibid., 109.
5 Samuelson, 34.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
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would give doctors the incentive to reduce the number of procedures they perform,
but it also rewards doctors for spending as little time with each patient as possi-
ble. Much of the recent activity in health care reform involves Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), which receive fees from each customer and then try to save
money spent on health care by restricting procedures to those which are necessary.
One problem with this is that HMOs have an incentive to cater only to they healthy.
1.3.5 Public and Private Reactions to Rising Costs
According to Letsch, the trend of increases in the share of GDP devoted to health care
has typically caused both public and private actions to control spending growth. For
example, after rapid growth in this share in 1980 and 1982, Medicare's prospective
payer system was implemented along with other reforms of the private insurance
industry. 9 Letsch observes that, over the last three decades, the proportion of health
care costs paid by public and private third party payers has generally increased.
Therefore their concern with rising costs is understandable. Third parties paid for 81
percent of all health care in 1991. The 81 percent figure is an increase from 76 percent
in 1980, 66 percent in 1970, and 51 percent in 1960. In 1991, public sources paid 37
percent, and private parties paid 44 percent, while expenditures from the pockets of
consumers amounted to a mere 19 percent of health spending.2 0
Different health care payers react differently to increases in health care expendi-
tures. Employers who provide health care to their employees may reevaluate different
variables, such as the scope of their benefits, cost sharing, and deductibles. They may
consider changing the scope of their retirement benefits, or even eliminating them al-
together. Public health care payers consider their options for raising revenues and
tightening their regulations. Individuals must reevaluate their priorities and decide
if they can still afford insurance. Letsch concludes that "accelerated health spending
has resulted in increasing numbers of uninsured and underinsured persons who can-
19 Letsch, 94-95.
20 Ibid., 95-96.
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not afford to buy private health insurance yet do not qualify for public programs."2 1
Rising health costs and a perception of a weakened economy have stirred concerns
for the plight of those who are vulnerable because of their weak health or economic
status.
Letsch also points out that a major contributor to the spending growth .in 1991
was Medicaid, which was responsible for nearly one-third of the increase. She at-
tributes this increased contribution to the recent recession in America and attempts
by states to increase their identification of poor individuals, and nontraditional fi-
nancing mechanisms on the part of states.2 2
1.3.6 Cost Reduction and Information Technology
Telecommunication and information technology has been seen as a solution to cost
problems in the American health care system. A study by the consulting firm Arthur
D. Little concludes that increasing the application of telecommunications technology
to health care can reduce annual costs by $36 billion.23 Even though the total budget
is nearly $1 trillion, this is a significant savings.2 4 In fact, the study holds that
this savings figure is both "conservative" and "low" because the study only involves
"commercially available" technology and leaves out projections based on technological
advance.2 5 The study looks at the following four applications:
* "Electronic management and transport of patient information"
* "Electronic submission and processing of health care claims"
* "[Electronic inventory management systems"
* "The use of video conferencing for professional training and remote medical
consultations." 26
2 1 Ibid., 94-95.
2 2 Ibid., 97, 100-102.
2 3 Arthur D. Little, Inc., "Telecommunications: Can It Help Solve America's Health Care Prob-
lems? (Reference 91810-98)," (Cambridge MA]: Arthur D. Little, 1992), 2.
24 See section 1.3.1 on page 10 above.
2 5 Arthur D. Little, 12.
26 Ibid., 13.
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But what is the relationship between telecommunications and information technol-
ogy? The study remarks, "It should also be noted that as we move further into the
Information Age the line between telecommunications and information processing be-
gins to blur."2 7 Although these applications which the study surveyed are "largely
telecommunications in nature," they each also contained "an information processing
component." 28
According to the report, "The United States has not yet linked the telecommuni-
cations infrastructure to the health care infrastructure." 2 9 It is for this reason that
medical privacy should be a present priority in health care reform. Telecommunica-
tions and information technology are a source of savings right now. According to the
study, technology is not the limiting factor in gaining these savings. Rather, what
is lacking is "the vision and momentum to apply it on a broad scale."30 There are
incentives for its further development and use. Furthermore, another major finding
of the study is that "[t]he impact is not limited to cost reductions. Telecommunica-
tions applications can have a profound impact on both the quality and accessibility
of health care."31 Thus, the study confirms one of the positions that this work de-
velops, that information technology will impact all three major health care concerns:
cost, quality, and access. Medical privacy should be considered alongside the other
concerns, as we do in in chapter 2.
1.3.7 Cost Planning and Information Technology
As pointed out above while discussing the role of third party payment, the American
health care system offers both doctors and patients significant power to make decisions
on an individual basis, free from planning by the federal government. Similarly, the
United States federal government yields important health decisions to state and local
governments. Uwe Reinhardt writes:
2 7 Ibid., 12.
2 8 Ibid., 11.
29Ibid., 10.
30 Ibid., 33.
31Ibid., 2. See also the conclusions on page 33 of the study.
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Although American health policy analysts frequently speak of a national
health policy, there does not exist in the United States a genuine national
health policy of the breadth and coherence characteristic of national health
policies in other countries. For example, there is no national policy on the
health services to which every American child should be entitled or, for
that matter, to which every American should be entitled. The defini-
tion of these entitlements has always been viewed as a state and local
prerogative 2
In order to plan a national health care system in any centralized way, a tremen-
dous amount of information is needed. As information technology increases in its
power, a government's ability to keep track of large systems simultaneously increases.
Lawrence Gostin at al. illustrate this idea when they write, "[T]he integrity of infor-
mation is critical to quality patient care, assessment of services, research, and public
health."3 3 Obviously, if the government is trying to manage a nation's health care
resources, it must have information on what treatments are effective and how much
they cost so that it can make sure that each dollar spent on health care achieves the
maximum health benefits. Likewise, information is needed in order to plan for the
future. These are the kind of interests which must be kept in mind while debating
health care reform and the medical privacy policy which will emerge from it. The
need for information for the purpose of planning must be balanced with the need to
protect privacy rights.
1.4 Quality
1.4.1 Minority Health Outcomes
In support of the idea that health care should be a right, some researchers use statis-
tics regarding health outcomes in the U.S. to raise questions about the quality of
32Uwe Reinhardt, "The United States: Breakthroughs and Waste," Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law (Winter 1992): 638.
3 3 Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., "Privacy and Security of Personal Information in a New Health Care
System," JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association (Nov. 24, 1993): 2487. According
to the article, Gostin was a member of the President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform.
However, the article contains a disclaimer specifying that it is not an official finding of that group.
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American health care and the equity of its distribution. Some are concerned that
lack of access leads to diminished health quality for minorities and the poor. Accord-
ing Uwe Reinhardt:
Hispanic and black households have a substantially lower median income
than white households, and these income differentials translate themselves
into differences in life-style, living environment, health insurance status,
and access to health care, and hence, into differential health status. In
1987, for example, the average life expectancy at birth for white males
was 72.1 years, but only 69.7 years for black males. For white and black
females the corresponding figures were 78.8 and 73.8. respectively.34
Reinhardt also writes, "In terms of maternal and child health, too, health status for
whites is superior to that of non-whites (and both have a higher infant mortality rate
than many other nations)."3 5
1.4.2 Health Outcomes Compared to Other Countries
In addition, some are concerned that despite its comparatively large health expendi-
tures, when compared to other nations, the U.S. lags in health quality. Diane Duffy
gives the following comparative health outcome statistics:3 6
Infant Mortality Life Expectancy Maternal
Country Rate per 1,000 At Birth Mortality per
Live Births (yrs) 100,000 Births
United States 10.5 75 15.2
Canada 9.1 75 10.8
France 9.0 75 24.0
Norway 7.8 76 3.3
Sweden 7.0 76 2.7
United Kingdom 10.1 73 17.2
West Germany 10.1 74 45.9
3 4U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, quoted in Reinhardt, 639.
35 Reinhardt, 639.
36 Quoted in Diane Duffy, "The Effect of Sweden's Corporatist
Outcomes," Scandinavian Studies (Spring/Summer 1989): 129.
Structure on Health Policy and
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However, the conclusions drawn from these statistics must be critically examined.
Reinhardt warns:
It is, of course, risky to introduce health status indicators of this sort
into cross-national comparisons of health systems, because these statistics
are driven by a large host of economic, environmental, and behavioral
factors. Such differences are not easily eliminated with a medical model
of intervention. Therefore one cannot fairly attribute the health status
indicators they beget to the functioning of the health system per se.37
The same risk is involved in the use of minority health status statistics.
1.4.3 Quality and Information Technology
The Technical Side of Medicine Regardless of the degree of government inter-
vention in a health care system, that system will need the best possible information
in order to treat patients effectively. Illustrating this point, Lawrence Gostin and
his colleagues write, "[I]f clinical information is not readily available to health care
providers, the best interests of the patients may be significantly compromised." 38 This
is the technical side of medicine. Helminski writes, "Health information is reviewed
to ascertain that a certain standard of care has been met."39 She also points out that
"The most obvious review of this type occurs in a legal liability case."40 Meticulous
care in keeping medical records is necessary because "[f]ailure to maintain a complete
record may lead to an inference of negligence."'4 1 It will be interesting to observe
whether hospitals will be held liable for malpractice if they do not keep up with a
certain standard of technology regarding information technology, just as a tugboat
operator was held liable for failing to install a radio in the famous 1932 T.J. Hooper
case.4 2 A less threatening use of medical data, and therefore one that is less useful in
3 7Reinhardt, 639.
3 8Gostin et al., 2487.
3 9 Francis Helminski, "Health and Medical Records.' in George B. Trubow, ed. Privacy Law and
Practice (New York: Matthew Bender, 1990), ch.7, p.8.
4 0 Ibid.
4 1 Ibid., ch.7, p.10.
4 2 T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932).
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asserting the influence of prospective patients, insurance companies, and the govern-
ment, occurs in "routine peer review and quality assurance meetings, during which
health information is studied internally on a regular basis to ensure that the quality
of care in the institution meets appropriate standards. ." 43
The Management of Medicine As organizations increasingly manage health care
for cost effectiveness, whether HMOs, insurance companies, or the government, they
require more and more information. This is the management side of medicine. Il-
lustrating the need for information in both sides of medicine, Gostin et al. write,
"[T]he integrity of information is critical to quality patient care, assessment of ser-
vices, research, and public health."4 4 Therefore, both access to information and the
integrity of that information will improve the quality of medicine. In managing cost,
increased quality for the same price is always good. Furthermore, information about
health outcomes-what works, what does not- helps health managers plan the allo-
cation of resources more effectively. According to Reinhardt, because of recent studies
showing waste in America's health care system, there is a growing interest in using
computer databases in the area of quality assurance in order to prevent the execution
of unnecessary procedures:
Spurred on by these studies, and by the ever-mounting national health bill,
both the government and the business sector have recently embraced the
idea of a wholesale research assault on this issue [of quality assurance]. It
is envisaged that, ultimately, there will be a giant, national database that
makes it possible to link a patient's sociodemographic background and
medical treatments to his or her life-style one or several years subsequent
to the medical intervention.4 5
Reinhardt points out that Congress appropriated $50 million to research this issue,
with expected increases in that budget over time.46 Finding out what measures are
cost-effective is important. Therefore, when developing medical privacy policy, the
43 Helminski, ch.7, p.8.
44Gostin et al., 2487.
4 5 Reinhardt, 662.
4 6 Ibid.
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need for information in both the management of medicine and its technical execution
must be taken in account. However, these monetary concerns must be balanced with
the patient's need for privacy, an important, though non-economic. concern. All
of these interests must be appropriately balanced. The real question, suggested by
Gostin et al., is "[H]ow much privacy does society want?"4 7 The question is germane
because so many other good things can be bought by trading away privacy. The
other important question is "By what process will society decide how much privacy
it wants?"48
1.5 Access to Services
1.5.1 Access and the Uninsured
Another major issue in the health care debate is access to services. Important ques-
tions include the following: How should the benefits of the American health system
be distributed? On what basis? Should health spending be limited, and if so, how
should this budget be allocated among the populace? What social mechanism allo-
cates access to health care in a way that is acceptably efficient and just? Is health
care a right of citizenship or a gift of charity? Should health care be distributed on
the basis of need or ability to pay? Should everyone in America be provided with
health insurance or only those who can afford it?49
At present, many Americans do not have health insurance. Although figures
regarding the number of uninsured in the U.S. are controversial, in 1987 the uninsured
population was estimated to be 37 million, or 15.5 percent of people under sixty-five,
according to Reinhardt.50 . As noted in section 1.3.5 on page 14 above, the issue of
rising health care costs is linked to the issues of access because rising costs reduce the
47 Gostin et al., 2487.
4 8 Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this thesis. Our focus here is on what legislative
initiatives and national and state policies will be required to protect medical privacy in a reformed
health care system.
4 9 Deborah A. Stone, "The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance," Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law (Summer 1993): 291-292.
5 0 Reinhardt, 648.
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amount of health benefits available to the less fortunate in society. Concern about
cost or access based upon theoretical principles is coupled with a practical concern
for the needs of those who are not receiving enough health care.
1.5.2 The Economics of the Insurance Industry
The Purpose and Structure of Insurance The purpose of insurance is protec-
tion against risk. With regard to health care, consumers face a risk of paying a high
amount of money should they become sick. Consumers of health insurance pay a
fixed amount (called a premium) annually in order to receive benefits (called cov-
erage) to pay for health expenditures should they become sick. Upon getting sick,
health insurance consumers sometimes pay a fixed amount (called a deductible) and
a percentage of the remaining costs (called the co-payment). Premiums, coverage,
deductibles, and co-payments differ according to the insurance plan.
The Necessity of Calculating Risk Insurance companies collect premiums from
all of their customers, and from this pool they draw the money to pay for coverage
when claims are made, for overhead, and for profits. Therefore, it is essential for an
insurance firm to be able to calculate its likelihood of paying for claims in order to
charge rates at which it can make a profit. Two problems that insurance companies
face in doing this are moral hazard and adverse selection.
The Problem of Moral-Hazard Moral hazard refers to the tendency that people
have to alter their behavior opportunistically after taking out an insurance policy in
order to bring themselves additional benefits at the expense of the insurance company.
For example, insurance policies give customers an incentive either to make false claims
on the policy or to engage in behavior more risky than was agreed upon with the
insurance company.5 1 According to Ruffin and Gregory, "If a moral-hazard problem
exists, people cannot buy as much insurance as they would in a world of perfect
51Roy J. Ruffin and Paul R. Gregory, Principles of Economics (Glenview [IL]: Scott, Foresman,
and Co., 1990), 665-666.
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information where their claim could be costlessly checked by insurance companies."52
Thus, reducing the moral-hazard problem would benefit consumers who wanted to buy
more insurance but could not, because of moral-hazard, and insurance companies who
would be able to make greater profits by selling more insurance to these customers.
Reducing the moral-hazard problem would also benefit consumers who want the same
amount of insurance at a lower price. Decreasing the costs of gathering information
about the behavior of insurance customers after taking out policies would reduce the
moral hazard problem. Information technology allows this to happen. 53
The Problem of Adverse Selection While moral hazard refers to incentives
given after a policy is taken out, adverse selection refers to the incentives faced by
insurance customers before taking out a policy. Consumers have the incentive to get
as much insurance coverage as they can for the least amount of money. Therefore, if
an insurance company lacks the information required to discriminate between high-
risk and low-risk buyers, it has two alternatives 1) it can pool all customers into one
group, or 2) it can offer policies with premiums that cause high-risk and low-risk
consumers to identify themselves simply by which policy they purchase. However,
According to Ruffin and Gregory, if an adverse-selection problem exists, one of the
following two consequences occur depending on the choice that the company makes:
1. "If all risk groups are pooled, the low-risk group subsidizes the insurance needs
of the high-risk group."
2. "If separate policies are offered to the low-risk and the high-risk groups, the
low-risk customers would find that they cannot buy enough insurance." 4
Therefore, whichever option the company chooses, it is in the interest of low-risk con-
sumers for the insurance company to have information to reduce the adverse selection
problem. It is also in the interest of the insurance company to get such information
if selling more insurance to low-risk customers would increase profits.55
52 Ibid., 666.
5 3Ibid., 665-666.
54 Ibid., 666-667.
5 5 Ibid.
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1.5.3 Two Competing Views of Justice
According to Deborah Stone, the United States health care system is engaged in a
conflict between two views of distributive justice, "actuarial fairness" and the "solidar-
ity principle."5 6 The term "actuarial fairness" refers to the idea that each individual
should pay based upon his or her own risk.57 The term "solidarity principle" refers
to the idea that a community should pool its resources in order to help those who
need it most.5 8 Stone writes: "But the underlying question is whether medical care
will be distributed as a right of citizenship or as a market commodity."59
1.5.4 Two Visions of Community
In addition, the clash between these two ideas of justice represent a conflict over
"competing visions of community."60 Stone describes the way insurance creates com-
munities:
Insurance underwriting, far from being a dry statistical exercise, is a polit-
ical exercise in drawing the boundaries of community membership. That
insurers always understood they were creating communities of privilege is
very clear.61
Stone offers a colorful quote from the 1930 president of New York Life Insurance
Company, Darwin Kingsley, to illustrate her point:
This contribution to Life Insurance [the company's system of numerical
rating] has taken an innumerable army of men and women out of the
Purgatory of the impaired and put them into the Paradise of the insured.62
Actuarial fairness seeks to break people further and further into groups of similar
risk. According to Stone, the idea of actuarial fairness breaks "communities into
56 Stone, "Struggle," 287.
57 Ibid., 290.
5 8Ibid., 291.
5 9 Ibid., 288.
6 0Ibid., 289.
6 1 Ibid., 299.
62 Quoted in Ibid.
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ever-smaller, more homogeneous groups... by fostering in people a sense of their
differences, rather than their commonalities, and their responsibility for themselves
only."63 Stone observes that if this process could be carried to its logical conclusion,
the usefulness of insurance would disappear, because each person would be entirely
responsible for his of her own risk. The solidarity principle seeks to foster an inter-
dependence between individuals, an interdependence in which those who are not as
needy share with those who are needy. Therefore, the solidarity principle defines a
community of diverse risk groups, groups larger than the individual or those sharing
the same risk level.
Often American advocates of national health insurance see such a proposal as
a way to unify various interests in a diverse nation into a community, rather than
pitting them selfishly against one another. For example, Uwe Reinhardt writes:
[T]here is no national policy on the health services to which every Amer-
ican child should be entitled or, for that matter, to which every American
should be entitled. The definition of these entitlements has always been
viewed as a state and local prerogative. Other nations typically consider
the articulation of such entitlements at the national level fundamental to
their sense of nationhood.64
One such nation is Canada, which uses national health insurance as a symbol of its
national cohesiveness in the face of the diversity of its population.6 5 While describing
that system Robert Evans writes:
Canadians are, by and large, satisfied with their health care system. It
is for them a symbol of their community and distinguishes them from
the United States. Unlike the health care system of that country, it is
universal, comprehensive, and accessible, and it costs less as a percentage
of GNP to run66 .
63 Ibid., 290.
64 Reinhardt, 638. Emphasis mine.
6 5Idea from Professors Immergut and Sapolsky's class, "Health Policy." (17.205).
6 6 Robert G. Evans, "Canada: The Real Issues," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
(Winter 1992): 739.
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He also notes:
Far more than just an administrative mechanism for paying medical bills,
it is widely regarded as an important symbol of community, a concrete
representation of mutual support and concern. In a nation subject to
strong divisive forces rooted in both geography and history, the health
insurance system is an important unifying idea as well as an institution.
It expresses the fundamental equality of Canadian citizens in the face of
disease and death and a commitment that the rest of the community,
through the public system, will help each individual with these problems
as far as it can.6 7
The diversity in America brings similar, and possibly greater, forces which threaten
to tear the country apart. Consider the 1992 riots in Los Angeles and other instances
of violence between various ethnic and racial groups within American cities. National
health insurance with universal coverage can be seen as a way to heal ethnic and class
tension by having the government unify these groups in a community and provide for
their needs.
The solidarity principle is good in that it reminds the rich and the poor as well as
the sick and the healthy that they are interdependent upon each other in society. The
principle tries to prevent people from mistreating other people because of the station
in life to which they were born. However, one problem in the solidarity principle as
applied to health care is that it also subsidizes various behaviors. The Clinton plan is
an example of applying the solidarity principle to health insurance because it uses an
insurance rule called "community rating." In a critique of the Clinton plan, Elizabeth
McCaughey writes:
Another rule, "community rating," requires insurers to offer the same
basic package to everyone in the region for the same price. Smokers and
non-smokers, drug abusers and nonusers pay the same. Community rating
means that the sick are not thrown overboard, but it makes those who
adopt healthy behavior subsidize those who do not... 68
67Ibid., 740. It is important to remember that, although it is supported with funding from the
national government, Canada's public health insurance system is based upon the plans of each
separate province. Evans points out this fact (742). As a result, differences between the plans in
each province are possible.
68 Elizabeth McCaughey "Health Plan's Devilish Details," Wall Street Journal, Sep. 30, 1993, 18.
Citations omitted.
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This criticism assumes a value judgment on behavior, and in a diverse, pluralistic
society such as America, it is very difficult for society to agree enough on value
judgments to embody them in the law. However, national health insurance will have
to make value judgments on a national level because insurance requires that these
kinds of value judgments be made. As Deborah Stone writes:
Insurance is a social endeavor ... and insurability is a collective decision
about membership, not a natural trait of individuals. A person is insur-
able if a group (fraternal organization, mutual benefit society, insurance
company, government program) decides it will extend mutual aid to him
or her.6 9
National health insurance is an attempt to make a nation into one large mutual aid
community. In that case, a nation must decide its values in the same way that an
insurance company must. It must decide which behaviors or conditions warrant aid
and which do not. The assessment of risk often consists of a mixture of objective
and subjective criteria. Stone illustrates this when writing about numerical rating, a
method by which insurance companies implement the principle of actuarial justice to
insurance. Stone writes:
The numerical rating system, and the underwriting guides and rating
manuals it spawned, have all the trappings of scientific objectivity-
medical terminology, elaborate matrices of diseases and point values, and
numbers-but they often seem to be based as much on social prejudices
and stereotypes as on empirical knowledge.70
Therefore, because insurance is a social activity, not merely a scientific one, national
health insurance implies agreement on a national value system. Because of America's
pluralism, this is a very difficult thing to construct in America today. As an example
of the sensitivity of the issue of national health insurance, consider the relationship
of AIDS to behavior.7 1 Under community rating, those who do not approve of the
homosexual lifestyle will help subsidize the health care costs associated with it. Or
6 9Stone, "Struggle," 298.
7 0Ibid.
7 1lMarian Wallace, "Reform or Ruin? National Health Care," Family Voice, Jan. 1994, 5.
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consider abortion. Will national health insurance subsidize abortions or leave them
without subsidy? Either choice implies a position on abortion. The issue of national
health insurance forces the United States to address its most divisive issues. This
degree of conflict will not build community in America, given its present state of its
political struggles. Instead, it will merely show the present lack of community in the
United States.
Furthermore, according to McCaughey, the solidarity principle as embodied in
the Clinton plan' health alliances will work to destroy community even on factors
which are not related to behavior but birth (such as race) and other factors (such
as geography). In President Clinton's plan, a health alliance is a group of insurance
consumers unified by the government based on geography in order to negotiate lower
premiums. About them, McCaughey writes:
The [Clinton] plan requires states to create health alliance regions-
similar to election districts. How those alliance lines are drawn will de-
termine which areas of the state are hit with the highest health care
premiums, because they are shouldering the costs of health coverage for
the inner city poor. The system promises to pit black against white, poor
against rich, city against suburb....
Some alliances will bear especially heavy social burdens, others will
not. Everyone will figure put that you get more health care for your
dollar or pay lower premiums in an alliance without inner city problems.
The plan will be an incentive for employers to abandon cities and relocate.
Considering the number of court battles when states draw election
districts, lawsuits over "medical gerrymandering" are inevitable.... Home
prices and litigation fees will rise and fall depending on which suburbs are
sucked into metropolitan areas and which escape.7 2
According to McCaughey, because of its implementation of the solidarity principle,
the Clinton plan "will make racial tensions fester and produce mean-spirited political
struggles and lawsuits to shirk the cost of medical care for the urban poor."73
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1.5.5 Actuarial Fairness and Information Technology
Medical Underwriting The implementation of the ideal of actuarial fairness re-
quires an process called "medical underwriting." 74 According to Stone, "[u]nder-
writing entails gathering information about applicants to determine their risk status
and then selecting the better risks to insure." 75 Although this can be expressed
as fairness to the insurance customer, for the insurer, it is a fundamental business
strategy: 76
[T]ailoring prices to finely differentiated risks is the keystone of insurers'
competitive marketing strategy. They seek to gain a larger share of the
market for various types of insurance by offering the lowest prices for
coverage. A firm can offer lower prices if it can separate the potentially
healthy from the potentially sick and offer insurance only to the healthy.77
The Medical Information Bureau (MIB) The Medical Information Bureau
(MIB) in Westwood, MA is an organization started in 1902 which now links 750
insurance companies.78 Stone describes MIB as "the [insurance] industry's central
data bank for medical information on insurance applicants and policyholders."79 Ac-
cording to MIB, "MIB's ranks now included virtually every major company issuing
individual life, health and disability insurance in the United States and Canada."8 0
In its own words, its purpose is "to detect and deter fraud upon insurers and their
policyholders."8 MIB has files "on more than 15 million people."8 2 It is the only such
data bank in the health insurance industry.8 3 Insurance companies can check whether
MIB has a record on any applicants, and if so, they can receive the record.8 4 MIB
7 4Stone, "Struggle," 287.
7 5Ibid., 295.
7 6Ibid., 294.
7 7Ibid.
7 8Medical Information Bureau, Inc. (MIB), "The Consumer's MIB Fact Sheet," 1, and "A Con-
sumer's Guide," 5. No date for either document. Material available from the Medical Information
Bureau, Inc., Westwood, MA.
79 Stone, "Struggle," 313.
8 0MIB, "Guide," 5.
8 1MIB, "Sheet," 6.
8 2 Gary Seidman, "This Is Your Life Mr. Smith...," New York Times, Aug. 1, 1993, sec.3, p.7.
83 Ibid.
8 4MIB, "Guide," 6.
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forbids its member companies from basing insurance decisions entirely on its codes,
insisting instead that insurers seeks to verify the information themselves.8 5 However,
Seidman reports a case in which an insurer violated this policy and increased an ap-
plicant's disability premium by 25 percent based on mistaken information.8 6 MIB's
revenue comes entirely from annual dues paid by its insurers and access fees for each
inquiry, which combined amount to about $1.25 to $1.50 per transaction.8 7 Insurers
use MIB "more than 80,000 times a day."8 8 This comes out to be at least $100,000
in revenue per day.
MIB relies on insurance companies to send it records.8 9 Insurance companies send
MIB information on about 15 percent of its applicants, those whose risk seems higher
than usual or who seem prone to fraud.90 According to MIB, it only requires insur-
ance companies to send information "[i]f, and only if, an applicant has a condition
significant to health or longevity."91 The kind of information that MIB monitors are
such characteristics as "height, weight, electrocardiogram results, emotional difficul-
ties, suicide attempts," "a criminal record," "a history of dangerous driving,"or "a
fondness for hazardous sports."9 2 In addition, MIB also identifies individuals using
"name, birthdate, birthstate, occupation" and the region of the country where they
live.93 According to MIB, "Social Security Numbers are not included in MIB reports,
but this may change."9 4 MIB reports do not mention claims filed or the decisions
made by insurance companies regarding insurability.9 5
MIB policies to protect privacy include documenting all access to its files and
maintaining security measures.9 6 MIB also allows consumers, at no cost, to find out
8 5Ibid., 7.
8 6 Seidman, 7.
8 7Ibid.
8 8 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
9 0Ibid.
9 1MIB, "Guide," 5.
9 2 Seidman, 7.
93 MIB, "Guide," 6.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
9 6 Ibid., 8-9.
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if MIB has a file on them and receive a copy of the report.97 Consumers can challenge
MIB records by requesting that the insurance company which originally reported the
information reinvestigate that information.9 8 MIB also allows consumers to file a dis-
pute about the reinvestigation so that their record states which fact is in dispute.99
In an interview with Seidman, the president of MIB, Neil Day, said that, in the previ-
ous year, 10,000 people asked to see their files, and 800 of them raised challenges.1 00
According to Day, 400 of these cases led to some correction. 0 Although "patterned
after federal law," MIB's policies of disclosure and corrections were established vol-
untarily by MIB in 1971.1°2 Since 1983, the Federal Trade Commission has regulated
these procedures.l'0 3
1.5.6 The Solidarity Principle and Information Technology
However, implementation of the solidarity principle on a national scale in the United
States also requires an advanced system of information technology. As mentioned
before in section 1.3.7 on page 16, in order for a nation's central government to be
able to ensure universal health care, it must possess information to plan budgets,
prevent fraud, monitor quality and cost-effectiveness. This requires a centralized
network of telecommunication and information technology. The very fact that the
government would possess and manipulate this information under national health
insurance necessitates privacy protections for this information. Under the Clinton
plan, each American would carry a Health Security Card with a magnetic stripe on
the back which would access such a centralized medical information network. In fact,
President Clinton has used the card as a symbol of government protection both of the
individual and the solidarity idea of community. In his speech introducing his health
care plan to Congress he said while holding up the card, "With this card, if you lose
97 Ibid., 9-10.
98Ibidr, 10.
99Ibid.
'°°Seidman, 7.
'aIbid.
°
0 2MIB, "Guide," 11.
1 0 3Ibid.
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your job or you switch jobs, you're covered."104 The existence of the this medical
information by itself in a permanent form necessitates some sort of protection, but in
the hands of one central entity, this necessity is even larger.
1.6 The Need for Medical Privacy Reform
Although medical privacy is involved in health care reform, it is a separate issue on
its own. "The collection and transmission of vast amounts of health information in
automated form," according to Lawrence Gostin, et al., "will occur with or without
reform of the health care system." 05 This is understandable in light of the savings and
other benefits discussed in the Arthur D. Little study.'0 6 Although privacy protection
for medical information is recognized as part of the U.S. Constitution, this protection
can vary according to developing Supreme Court interpretations.10 7 Also, according
to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, although statutes define the Federal
government's use of information, "no Federal statute defines an individual's specific
right to privacy in his or her personal health care information held in the private
sector and by State or local governments."'108
Furthermore, the integration of various state rule systems and the federal regula-
tion is a major problem. A report of the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
writes, "There is significant variation in the nature and quality of State laws regard-
ing privacy and health care information." 109 Gostin et al. write, "Legal protection of
privacy in the current health care system is highly variable."" 0 Noted privacy expert
Alan Westin agrees:
State law [on medical privacy] is extraordinarily diverse and, in many
l0 4 Robin Toner, "Clinton's Health Plan: News Analysis; Pledging Peace of Mind," New York
Times, Oct. 28, 1993, sec.A, p.1.
'
5Gostin, et al., 2487.
'
0 6 See section 1.3.6 on page 15 above.
1 7U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Computerized Medical
Information (OTA-TCT-576) (Washington [DC]: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 14. Will
be abbreviated in subsequent references as "U.S. OTA."
'
0 8 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 15.
"
0 Gostin, et al., 2489.
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cases, antiquated. We're moving toward regional information systems and
national exchange of [medical] information, so the time is right to enact
broad federal legislation."'
According to Helminski, "Although there is some uniformity in the right to privacy
concerning health information among the states, the diversity of laws relating to this
information renders the formulation of general principles quite difficult."1 12 Gostin's
group quotes a recent U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report which
describes the current medical privacy system as "a morass of erratic law, both statu-
tory and judicial."1 13 The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment concurs:
This patchwork of State and Federal laws addressing the question of pri-
vacy in medical data is inadequate to guide the health care industry with
respect to obligations to protect the privacy of medical information in a
computerized environment. It fails to confront the reality that... infor-
mation will regularly cross State lines and will be therefore be subject to
inconsistent legal standards.... The law allows development of private
sector businesses dealing in computer databases and data exchanges of
patient information without regulation, statutory guidance, or recourse
for persons who believe they have been wronged by abuse of data. 4
The solution is a uniform national policy towards medical information. Accord-
ing to Representative Gary Condit (D-CA), "There is too much interstate transfer
of patient information to continue to rely on differing state confidentiality laws."115
Condit is working to pass national privacy legislation along with whatever health re-
form plan emerges from Congress.1l6 The present movement towards national health
care reform is the prime opportunity to articulate a national medical privacy policy.
According to a poll conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., and Equifax,
Inc., 85 percent of American surveyed "rated privacy protection as one of the most
llQuoted in Mitch Betts, "Computerized Records: An Open Book?" Computerworld, Aug. 9,
1993, 14.
112 Helminski, ch.7, pp.3-4.
1l3Quoted in Gostin, et al., 2489, quoted from Workshop for Electronic Data Interchange. Report
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Washington [DC]: U.S. Government Printing Office,
July 1992), appendix 4.
114 U.S. OTA, 15.
"
5 Quoted in Betts, "Open Book?" 14.
ll6Ibid.
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essential elements of health care reform."'1 7 "The goals of integrity, availability, and
privacy can only be achieved," argue Gostin et al., "by establishing a national privacy
and security framework.""' 8 Even more emphatic is the opinion of Janlori Goldman,
the director of the Privacy and Technology project for the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU): "[G]etting one day into health reform without privacy safeguards
is very dangerous," because of the Clinton plan's vision of regional data exchanges
between doctors, insurers, and health alliances."l9 Sheri Alpert observes:
Because the health care system is to be reformed on a national scale,
conforming to a minimum set of standards, it is crucial that patients'
right to privacy and their confidentiality of their medical records also be
standard across the nation. Yet thus far, the fact that the law currently
does not provide consistent protection for most medical records has been
conspicuously absent from reform discussions. 120
Therefore, the health care reform debates provide the best context for also reforming
American medical privacy law by establishing appropriate nationwide standards. Be-
cause privacy is a concern of equal importance to other health care concerns which
have received more attention, such as cost, quality, and access, and because it affects
each of them, the shape of the reform debate should be modified to give privacy the
same degree of attention.
1.7 The Relevance of Medical Privacy
Why are privacy concerns important to this debate? While medical privacy is an
important subject on its own, in the context of the present health care reform debate,
privacy concerns form merely one of the many categories of issues to be considered,
along with cost, quality, and access, and other issues. However, there are several
reasons why medical privacy deserves special attention in this debate. First of all,
1 7Treported in Ibid., 63.
"
8 Gostin et al., 2487.
1 9reported in Betts, "Open Book?" 63.
12 0Sheri Alpert, "Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy, and Health Care Re-
form," Hastings Center Report (Nov.-Dec. 1993): 13.
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privacy is a public good which can be traded in order to get other public goods. For
example, in a crude model, the cost of increasing the number of people who have
access to health care is decreased privacy, assuming that no additional safeguards are
added. Second, in the terms of the present reform debate, privacy is a much less
tangible statistic, as compared to the percentage of GNP spent on health care or
the number of Americans who are uninsured. By "tangible," I mean quantitatively
measurable using the methods of the natural or social sciences. Privacy is a very
ambiguous concept, difficult for even philosophers to define. Third, possibly as a
result of its relative lack of tangibility, privacy has not been discussed as often in the
debate as have these more tangible statistics. "The fact that the law currently does
not provide consistent protection for most medical records has been conspicuously
absent from reform discussions," according to Alpert. 2 Fourth, there is already
a medical privacy problem in the United States because of the diversity of privacy
laws throughout the nation. Fifth, privacy is a quality that preserves the dignity of
human beings, but it will not be protected naturally. The force of law must protect
human dignity against the natural tendency of people to exploit that dignity for
their own selfish gain. Sixth, rapid advances in technology make it urgent that the
United States act to protect privacy, and protect it in a way that will continue to
develop as quickly as technology does. In The Abolition of Man, C.S. Lewis argues
the dangers of combining technological power with moral relativism. The culmination
of his arguments describes the arbitrary use of technological power by the elite to
condition others:
I am only making clear what Man's conquest of Nature really means and
especially that final stage in the conflict, which perhaps, is not far off. The
final stage is come when Man by eugenics, by pre-natal conditioning, and
by an education and propaganda based on a perfect applied psychology,
has obtained full control over himself.... The battle will indeed be won.
But who precisely, will have won it?
For the power of Man to make himself what he pleases means... the power
of some men to make other men what they please.12 2
121Ibid.
122C.S. (Clive Staples) Lewis, The Abolition of Man, (New York: Collier, 1955), 72.
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Technological advance must be accompanied by advances in ethical standards in or-
der that technology will not be used to exploit others. Finally, privacy is a concept
strongly connected to one's ideas about the nature of humanity, and the degree to
which our country maintains an accurate view of privacy represents the degree to
which our country preserves an accurate view of humanity. Our present level of tech-
nology combined with our present ways of thinking about the world present society
with the temptation to view human beings as merely objects. Many forces in present
society seek to represent human beings nothing more than commodities or machines.
Health care is the arena which human beings meet technology in the most intimate
way. Therefore, it is vital, as technology continues to advance, that our nation de-
velop a legal view of medical privacy that will protect human beings by seeing them
as they are, as persons, not objects to be exploited.
1.8 Survey of Chapters
This chapter gave an overview of the issues involved in debating U.S. health care
reform and how reform relates to the medical privacy rights. Chapter 2 will survey
current medical privacy law and relevant court cases. Chapter 2 will also include a
look at philosophical considerations of privacy, the legal status of the privacy right in
general, and the law concerning medical privacy in particular. The way that current
medical privacy law balances the various interests involved will be examined there.
The first half of this work, Chapters 1 and 2 relate the problems to be solved at the
intersection of health care reform and medical privacy, along with the background
necessary to understand these problems. The second half of this thesis, chapters 3 and
4 will look at possible solutions to policy problems involving medical privacy. Chapter
3 will describe important evaluation criteria for any provision to protect medical
privacy. Using these criteria, three proposed health care reform plans currently before
Congress will be evaluated on their protection of medical privacy and the way that
they balance the various interests involved: the Clinton plan, the Cooper plan, and
the Nickles plan. Chapter 4, the concluding chapter, will give policy recommendations
36
for protecting medical privacy rights in a reformed health care system.
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Chapter 2
Medical Privacy and Current U.S.
Law
In this chapter, the current legal structure of medical privacy in the United States
will be discussed. First, the philosophical underpinnings of both privacy in general
and medical privacy will be given. Then, the structure of general privacy rights
in America will be discussed, stemming both from tort law and constitutional law.
Two important court cases will then be discussed: Whalen v. Roe', the primary
Supreme Court decision involving medical privacy; and U.S. v. Westinghouse,2 a
Circuit Court of Appeals case, which is important for its policy of deciding when an
invasion of privacy has occurred regarding medical records. The implications of these
cases for health care reform will then be explored.
2.1 Terms
The term "privacy" is difficult to define. Although a more precise discussion of the
term will follow below in section 2.2.2 on page 40, one way to define it is "the right of
individuals have to exercise their autonomy and to limit the extent of their personal
'Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (U.S. Supreme Court 1977).
2U.S. v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir., 1980).
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domain to which others have access."3 The term "security," according to Alpert,
is "a set of technical and administrative procedures designed to protect or restrict
access to information." 4 In general, privacy is the end to be achieved, while security
is the means of achieving it. The term "confidentiality," according to Alan Westin,
refers to the policies of an organization towards the information it collects.5 The
term "medical privacy" refers to the interest patients have in restricting disclosure
of information gathered about them in the process of their receiving health care.
Helminski defines several other useful terms for the discussion of medical privacy.
The term "health information" refers to "the data recorded."6 This information is
stored on a "record."7 Records can be "microfilm, computer data, and any other
physical retrievable form the information may assume."8 Any person whose data is
stored is called the "data subject." 9 "Second parties" refer to people "who collect
and store the information."1 0 "Third parties" refer to anyone else, "anyone without
immediate access or right to the health information." 
2.2 Philosophical Considerations
2.2.1 Ethics
Descriptive and Normative Statements In her book Computer Ethics, Deb-
orah Johnson points out that there are two kinds of statements about behavior-
descriptive and normative: "Descriptive statements are statements about how people
in fact behave."'12 She points out that social scientists make descriptive statements
when relating their empirical observations of things that happen in the world. An
3 Alpert, 19.
4Ibid.
5 Quoted in U.S. OTA, 8-9.
6 Helminski, ch.7, p.3.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
1°Ibid.
llIbid.
'
2 Deborah Johnson, Computer Ethics, (Englewood Cliffs [NJ]: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 6.
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example from the topic at hand would be, "The United States spent x percent of its
GDP on health care last year." "In contrast, the philosophical study of morality,"
Johnson writes, regarding ethics, "is prescriptive or normative. It is concerned with
showing not what people actually do, but rather with what people ought to do."13
An example from the topic at hand would be, "The United States ought to increase
its protection of individual privacy rights." Johnson reminds us that morality can be
studied using either kind of approach.14
Epistemology and Ethics Epistemology and ethics are two branches of philoso-
phy. Ethics is an endeavor to determine and apply principles that ought to be followed
in behavior. It answers the question, "What ought to be done?" Epistemology is the
study of knowledge and its justification. It answers the question, "How can what
is true be known?" Johnson points out one link between ethics and epistemology:
"...ethics is not just a matter of applying normative rules. The rules we apply must
themselves be justified, or the whole enterprise will be shaky."1 5 In other words, it
is not sufficient to apply simply any rules at all, but only rules that have a basis in
reality. John Frame points out a second link, in the other direction, between knowing
and doing, that knowledge brings an obligation to live consistently with it:
I suggested earlier... that epistemology could be understood as a subdi-
vision of ethics.... All of our decisions should be reconciled with what we
know to be true. We must live in truth, walk in truth, do the truth....
To know is to respond rightly to the evidence and norms available to us. 16
2.2.2 Privacy in General
Privacy is a sophisticated philosophical topic. 7 Therefore, it is important that the
term "privacy" be defined well. In his article "Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of
13Ibid., 7.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
6 John Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, (Phillipsburg [NJ]: Presbyterian and Re-
formed, 1987), 149.
17This section draws upon a paper that I wrote for the MIT class "Law, Technology, and Public
Policy" (TPP 32J) taught by Nicholas Ashford and Charles Caldart.
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the Literature," Ferdinand Schoeman surveys the issues at stake in the philosophical
debate about privacy. According to him, various definitions of privacy include:
1. "[A] claim, entitlement, or right of an individual to determine what information
about himself (or herself) may be communicated to others."
2. "[T]he measure of control an individual has over... information about
himself..."
3. "[T]he measure of control an individual has over... intimacies of personal
identity..."
4. "[T]he measure of control an individual has over... who has sensory access to
him."
5. "[A] state or condition of limited access to a person.18
The differences among these definitions are subtle but important. Schoeman
points out that the trouble with definition 1 is that it assumes that privacy must
be protected as an absolute right. That is, it assumes that individuals should have
as much privacy as they desire without regard to other considerations. It also fails to
specify why privacy is important to this degree.19 A discussion of why privacy is im-
portant follows below. Definitions 2-4 all involve individual control over certain kinds
of information. According to Schoeman, these three definitions avoid the problem of
the first one, but they do not distinguish between a loss of privacy and a violation
of the right to privacy.20 He gives two examples which illustrate this problem. A
person stranded on a deserted island has much privacy-"too much,"as Schoeman
observes-but has no control over his or her own information. Also, a person who
is able to protect his or her own information perfectly but decides to reveal it all
to everyone around has no privacy but great control over information. 21 The last
18 Ferdinand David Schoeman, "Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature," in Schoe-
man, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge, 1984),
2-3.
19Ibid., 3.
20 Ibid.
2 1Ibid.
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definition avoids the difficulties of the others, and it also "leaves open the question of
whether privacy is a desirable state."2 2
Many people have been concerned that the prevalence of computers endangers the
privacy of citizens. The first question to ask is, "What is privacy, and why should it
be protected, at all?" According to Charles Fried, privacy is a strange sort of social
good. Privacy is useful for achieving other, more important things, like friendship,
love, trust, respect for others, and self-respect. Privacy builds a "context" in which
these activities can grow. Therefore, in one sense privacy is valuable as a means to an
end. However, it also seems to have some intrinsic value as an end in itself. Privacy
lies somewhere in between a right that should be protected at all costs and a tool
that is merely useful for other ends. Privacy is worth protecting because it is linked
to extremely valuable human activities, such as love and self-respect. In fact, privacy
cannot be separated from these activities.23
As Gary Marx and Sanford Sherizen write, "Privacy is an essential component of
individual autonomy and dignity."24 On the other hand, privacy is not of "ultimate
significance" because other qualities, such as these more valuable human activities.
override the importance of privacy. This nebulous and paradoxical quality of privacy is
what makes debates about privacy complicated.2 5 In addition, privacy has different
meanings for different people and different meanings depending on the situation.
Moreover, the privacy rights of different interests often conflict.26 One important
aspect of privacy, in Fried's view, is the prerogative of people to reveal what they want
about themselves. In other words, it is something more than just secrecy: "Privacy
is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather, it
is the control we have over information about ourselves."27 When privacy is strong,
22 Ibid., 3-4.
23 Charles Fried, "Privacy: A Rational Context," in M. David Ermann, Mary B. Williams, and
Claudio Gutierrez, eds., Computers, Ethics, and Society (New York: Oxford, 1990), 51 and 53.
2 4 Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen, "Monitoring on the Job," in Tom Forester, ed., Computers
in the Human Context: Information Technology, Productivity, and People (Cambridge [MA]: MIT,
1989), 398-399.
2 5Fried, in Ermann et al., 51, 53.
2 6Marx and Sherizen, in Forester, 398-399.
2 7Fried, in Ermann et al., eds., 54.
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individuals serve as the gatekeepers of their own interiors. The image of a gate is not
totally accurate because a gate is binary, either opened or closed. An individual with
privacy can choose any point along a spectrum of information to disclose to another.
Privacy allows a person not only to control whether a relevant situation is known by
others or not but how much detail about that situation is known. Fried gives the
example of an illness. When people have been sick, they can usually tell everyone
around them the general fact that they were sick. Privacy enables individuals to
restrict the people who know the specific nature of the illness. Furthermore, the
sight of someone suffering from the symptoms of the illness is even more privileged
information. For individuals to be seen suffering the symptoms of a severe illness
without their permission is a violation of their privacy. Because privacy implies the
discretion of revealing or concealing, privacy cannot exist without the possibility of its
invasion.2 8 Although the phrase "right to privacy" gives the impression that privacy
must be protected at all costs, privacy is not an absolute right. Therefore it must
be balanced with other societal interests. Johnson acknowledges this, but she argues
that this balance should favor the rights of the individual because organizations exist
for the sake of "fulfilling human needs and enhancing human life."2 9 This is a good
conclusion.
2.2.3 Computers and Privacy
Why do computers make the situation regarding privacy any different?30 Of course,
privacy was important before computers, and, because of its nature, it was subject to
threat. However, the prevalence of computers has enabled the collection of data which
gives a much more detailed picture of the everyday activities of citizens. Because
today's computer power is often used to record commercial activity, this kind of data
is called "transactional information." 3 1 Computers keep track of when telephone
28 Ibid.
2 9Johnson, 66-67.
3 0This section draws upon a paper that I wrote for Professors Ashford and Caldart in their MIT
class "Law, Technology, and Public Policy" (TPP 32J)
3 1David Burnham, "Data Protection," in Ermann et al., eds, 94-95.
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calls are made and to whom. Banks use computers to record check activity and funds
transferred by automatic teller machines (ATMs). Reservations made with airlines
or car rental companies are also recorded. Health records are kept on computer by
insurance companies through the Medical Information Bureau (MIB).32 Universities
collect personal information in order to determine financial aid. Information that
previously might have slipped into oblivion without the intervention of the individuals
involved is now preserved and stored by other individuals further removed from the
relevant situation. 33 This kind of information can be used in credit evaluations,
and insurance and employment decisions.3 4 Computers shift the balance of power
regarding privacy from the concerned individuals towards others. Computers make
it easier for concerned individuals to lose control of a larger quantity of information
about themselves.3 5 One must keep in mind that the mere presence of computers does
not inevitably destroy privacy. Computers create the possibility of diminished privacy,
and this is why they are a threat. Moreover, technology tends to change not only the
external world but also the way people think. Once a technology is introduced, it often
has unintended consequences, and these effects are hard to reverse. The tendency for
the power of computers to be abused must be countered actively. Therefore, the
existence of computers requires well-thought policies to protect privacy.3 6 It must be
noted that computerized information also brings benefits to society. A strong policy
regarding computers and privacy would balance the rights of society with the rights
of the individual.3 7
32 Tom Forester, High-Tech Society: The Story of the Information Technology Revolution (Cam-
bridge [MA]: MIT, 1987), 268.
33 Burnham, in Ermann et al., 94.
34Abbe Mowshowitz, The Conquest of Will: Information Processing in Human Affairs (Reading
[MA]: Addison-Wesley, 1976), 167.
35 Ibid.
36 Nathan Cobb, "The End of Privacy," Boston Globe, Apr. 26, 1992, 17.
37 Mowshowitz, 179-180.
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2.2.4 Medical Privacy
The importance of privacy to other relationships, discussed earlier, can be seen in the
area of medical privacy. The Hippocratic Oath, written between the Sixth and First
Centuries B.C., binds physicians not reveal those things learned in the process of
treatment "which should not be published abroad."3 8 The physician's responsibility
for patient confidentiality appears in other codes of professional ethics since then.3 9
Regarding his fears of what loss of privacy will do to the physician-patient rela-
tionship, one physician wrote:
Many physicians fear progressive emasculation of the special physician-
patient relationship and greater erosion of confidentiality... Likewise, physi-
cians fear patients will become less inclined to share needed facts... Our
once sacred relationship with patients is engaged to marry the technology
of the Information Age.4 0
According to Alpert, patients reveal the details necessary for their doctors to treat
them because they expect these details to remain confidential. The concern is that the
danger of violations of privacy rights with keep patients from trusting their doctors
enough to reveal the information necessary for adequate treatment. 41
2.3 General Privacy and U.S. Law
There are three major sources of privacy law in the United States: state common
law (tort law), federal and state statutes, and the U.S. Constitution.4 2 Two of these
sources will be discussed here: tort law and constitutional law.
3 Quoted in U.S. OTA, 13-14.
3 9U.S. OTA, 14.
4 0 Quoted in Alpert, 17-18.
41 Alpert, 18.
42U.S. OTA, 14-15.
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2.3.1 The Right of Privacy in Tort Law
In tort law, the right of privacy emerged in the United States in 1890, as the result
of an influential law review article by Warren and Brandeis. 43 According to Jeff
Meldman of MIT's Sloan School of Management, the tort right of privacy was a
distinctly American innovation within a legal system largely borrowed from Great
Britain. According to the Warren and Brandeis argument of the right of privacy in
tort law, the emergence of the right of privacy represented another step in the logical
progression in Anglo-American tort law over time from concrete to abstract rights.
Just as property tort claims progressed from trespass, to nuisance, to trade secrets and
intellectual property, so too did personal tort claims progress from battery (actually
hitting someone), to assault (merely threatening to hit), to defamation and invasion
of privacy.4 4 In addition to the evolution of legal doctrine, the evolution of technology
led to the emergence of a right to privacy in tort law. At the time of the Warren and
Brandeis article, 1890, the combination of the recent developments of photography
and newspaper technology had led to the power to take personal information from
individuals without their permission and gave a market for its profitable sale.4 5
In tort law, there are the following four possible varieties of invasion of privacy:
1. "Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another"
2. "Appropriation of the other's name or likeness"
3. "Unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life"
4. "Publicity that places the other in a false light before the public4 6
43This section draws from Prof. Jeff Meldman's MIT class "The American Legal System" (15.611).
4 4Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, Harvard Law Review (Dec. 15, 1980): 193-195.
4 5Ibid., 195-197.
4662A Am Jur 2d, Privacy §38. Footnotes omitted. This is the abbreviation for the legal encyclo-
pedia American Jurisprudence. See the bibliography for more details.
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2.3.2 A Note about Tort Law
Among various countries there are two kinds of legal systems: civil law and common
law. In this area, "civil law" refers to a system of codified law which specifies the
outcomes given certain enumerate fact situations. "Common law" refers to the oppo-
site, law made by a judge on a case by case basis. The use of precedent in common
law creates a body of these decisions over time, and future decisions draw on past
ones, given allowances for differing fact situations. "Tort law" refers to common law,
or case made law.
It is important to remember the history of the United States at this point. The
American legal system draws enormously from the legal tradition of Britain. While
the American Colonies were under the dominion of Britain, they shared the British
legal system. Each colony had its own common law. During the American Revolution,
the colonies broke away from British authority, but they kept the same legal system,
the same common law. The role of federalism in the American legal system becomes
important here. The colonies agreed to form a national government by ratifying the
Constitution in 1789. The Constitution defines the powers of the federal government
and leaves what is undefined to the authority of the states. Thus, the common law
of each state remained intact as long as it did not conflict with the federal statutes.
Tort law is state common law.47
2.3.3 The Right of Privacy and Constitutional Law
There is a great difference between the right of privacy in tort law and the constitu-
tional right of privacy. While tort rights refer to the resolution of cases in state and
local court, the Constitution is the supreme law of the United States, by which every
act of Congress, state legislatures, state courts, and lower Federal courts, those below
the Supreme Court, is judged. The constitutional right of privacy was first estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in 1965 with the case Griswold v. Connecticut.48 Judge
4 7 These ideas were developed in Jeff Meldman's MIT class "The American Legal System" (15.611).
4 8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (U.S. Supreme Court 1965).
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Robert Bork examines the legal idea of a constitutional right of privacy. Bork quotes
an opinion by Justice Blackmun's referring to "'the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone."' 49 The
phrase "to be let alone" occurs in the Warren and Brandeis discussion of the right of
privacy in tort law.50 Bork responds to Blackmun's statement by saying, "There is,
of course no general constitutional right to be let alone, or there would be no law." 51
Bork objects to interpreting the Constitution as containing a general right of privacy.
It is possible for Bork to oppose the idea of privacy while still advocating both the
privacy interests recognized in tort law and government policies that protect privacy.
Bork's main problem with the constitutional right of privacy is that for him, it is a
misinterpretation of the Constitution. Bork believes that the constitutional right of
privacy is a dangerous inclusion because it allows the judiciary to usurp power from
the legislatures.
2.3.4 Various Interests to Be Balanced
The issue of medical privacy and its place in health care reform is an issue combining
technology and public policy. Many complex interests must be balanced. According
to Helminski (1990), "Health information is recorded for diverse reasons: medical,
scientific, social, economic, and political."5 2 Gostin and his colleagues express the
effect of these diverse interests:
Protecting informational privacy poses complex problems of law, technol-
ogy, and health care provision. One component is public policy; how much
privacy does society want? The other component is technical; how much
privacy can society realistically ensure, at what cost, and with what effect
on the health care system?53
4 9 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, (New York:
Touchtone, 1990), 120.
5 0Warren and Brandeis, 205.
51 Bork, 120.
52 Helminski, ch.7, p.3.
53 Gostin et al., 2487.
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To this a third question should be added: "By what process will society decide how
much privacy it wants, and by what process will this level be decided and imple-
mented?"
Consumers Even though health providers may own a record, "the subject has a le-
gal interest in the record."5 4 Consumers have an interest in their own health records,
first, in a philosophical and legal sense, because these records are part of the infor-
mation that they have about themselves. However, these records also affect their
tangible interests. The accuracy of and access to their health information affects how
much insurance they can buy and how much they have to pay for it. Or if insurance
is provided to them through their job, health information can affect how much their
employer has to pay for insurance, and thus the consumer's employment prospects.
An employer could also use health information to judge an employee's possible perfor-
mance. Health information also could make consumers subject to unwanted solicita-
tions for buying products. Health information can also affect consumers' reputations
and their interpersonal relationships. As a result of the importance of health infor-
mation, consumers desire knowledge of who has information about them as well as
the nature of this information. Consumers also desire the ability to challenge health
information if it is incorrect.
Insurance Companies As discussed earlier, the ability of insurers to offer com-
petitive prices and to protect themselves from fraud and unknown risks depends on
their ability to gather information about their applicants. An organization such as
MIB also allows insurers to exchange information among themselves and thus draw
from other companies' experience.
Employers An employee's health status determines not only his or her job perfor-
mance, but also how much the employer pays for health insurance, if the employer
provides it. Employers might desire this information in order to estimate performance
49
54 Helminski, ch.7, pp.15-16.
and costs.
Medical Researchers Medical researchers and those involved with medical educa-
tion need health information in order to do their work: "Data are the cornerstones of
research, and clinical health information is as essential to research projects as it is to
medical education." 5 5 Furthermore, protection against liability is another reason for
maintaining meticulous records during medical research, and a long time may pass
before injuries from research appears.5 6
Providers and Hospitals Of course, doctors need health information for every
aspect of their jobs, for diagnoses and for patient monitoring. Doctors also must
kept meticulous records to protect themselves from malpractice suits. In addition,
providers or hospitals may own the records. According to Helminski, "There is no
controversy that medical records are owned, in a physical sense, by the physician,
dentist, or hospital which produced them."5 7 They may even be "transferred to
others, like any personal property," provided that the privacy rights of the subjects
are respected.58 Furthermore, hospitals and HMOs also need health information
for both clinical reasons and for management reasons. Hospitals need information
for quality control, malpractice protection, cost-effectiveness evaluation, and budget
planning.
Government Agencies and Law Enforcement Officials Some health infor-
mation must be given to government agencies for the sake of "public health and
welfare."5 9 Such information may include data regarding"birth and death," "com-
municable and venereal diseases," "[i]ndustrial accidents, abortions," "drug abuse,"
"cancer cases," "gunshot wounds and other violent incidents of maiming," as well as
"child abuse or suspected child abuse."60 Furthermore, the more that government
55Ibid., ch.7, p.8.
56Ibid., ch.7, p.12.
5 7 Ibid.
58Ibid.
59Ibid., ch.7, p.11.
6 0Ibid.
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agencies become involved in the planning and financing of health care, the more they
will have an interest in monitoring its quality and cost-effectiveness.
2.3.5 The Relevance of Court Cases
By discussing specific landmark federal court decisions on medical information pri-
vacy, one can gain a deeper understanding of the issues involved as well as the complex
trade-offs required between government information needs and personal the privacy
interests of citizens.
2.3.6 Court Case #1: Whalen v. Roe
Whalen v. Roe61 was a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1977. The decision was
unanimous.62 According to Alpert, Whalen is "[t]he major U.S. Supreme Court case
addressing medical information privacy."63 In 1972, the New York Legislature passed
a statute in order to prevent prescription drugs from being unlawfully distributed. 64
This statute tightened the previous controls on prescription drugs.65 A category called
"Schedule II" was created for "the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs." 6 6 All
prescriptions for these drugs were to be registered on an official form, which included
the patient's name, address and age.6 7 A copy of the form was to be sent to the New
York State Department of Health, where the data were "recorded on magnetic tapes
for processing by computer."68 Security measures existed for the health department's
data receiving room, such as "a locked wire fence" and "an alarm system." 69 In
addition, the statute and a health department regulation prohibited public disclosure
of the patients' identities.70 Penalties for violation of these prohibitions included one
61Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (U.S. Supreme Court 1977).
62Ibid., 590.
63 Alpert, 19.
64 Whalen, 589.
6 5Ibid., 591-592.
66 Ibid., 593.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69Ibid., 594.
7 0Ibid.
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year in prison and a fine of $2,000.71
Trial Court Decision A group of patients who used Schedule II drugs and two
associations of physicians brought a suit in District Court challenging the statute.7 2
The plaintiffs presented evidence that patients needing Schedule II drugs would de-
cline treatment for fear that "misuse of the computerized data will cause them to
be stigmatized as 'drug addicts."' 73 The holding of the District Court was that
"the doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones of privacy accorded constitutional
protection," a protection which the New York statute violated with "a needlessly
broad sweep."74 The District Court ordered an injunction which suspended of the
enforcement of the parts of the statute regarding the individual identification of the
patients.7 5
Issues On Appeal The appeal of the case raised the following two questions:
* Did New York have to prove the necessity of individually identifiable information
before requiring its record?
* Did the New York statute restrict the two constitutionally protected privacy in-
terests of "avoiding disclosure in personal matters" and "independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions," such as choosing medical treatment.7 6
Appeals Decision and Its Reasoning Regarding proof of the necessity of indi-
vidually identifiable information, the District Court had ruled that New York had not
demonstrated the necessity of New York's requirement that patients be identified.7 7
However, the Supreme Court held that this inability in itself did not render the
statute unconstitutional, because the statute was "the product of an orderly and ra-
tional legislative decision" and because states have "broad latitude in experimenting
7 1 Ibid., 594-595.
7 2 Ibid., 595.
73 Ibid.
7 4 Ibid., 596.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 599-600. Footnotes omitted.
77 Ibid., 596.
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with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern."78 Moreover, "the State's
vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs" was sufficient to al-
low such policy experimentation.79 The Supreme Court wrote, "It follows that the
legislature's enactment of a patient requirement was a reasonable exercise of New
York's broad police powers."8 0
Regarding the two constitutionally protected privacy interests of autonomy and
avoidance of disclosure, the Supreme Court held that the New York statute "does
not, on its face, pose sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a con-
stitutional violation."8 1 The Court identifies two possible privacy concerns relevant
to the statute. First, violations of the statute might come about through the actions
of the health department employees, who fail to maintain the proper security of the
records, either deliberately or through negligence.8 2 The court determined that past
experience in New York and other states demonstrates that the security provisions
of the statute "will be administered properly."8 3 Secondly, the stored data might
be revealed in a judicial proceeding involving a patient or doctor.8 4 This is relevant
because the purpose of the statute was to prevent patients and doctors from using or
distributing drugs unlawfully. Privacy violations caused by this situation are in the
court's view a "remote possibility" which is "not a sufficient reason for invalidating
the entire patient-identification program."8 5
But did knowledge of the statute's use of computers inhibit people from receiving
medical care? The Court says no. The Court acknowledges that evidence showed
that some people were deterred from seeking Schedule II drugs because of privacy
concerns.86 Even so, the Court concludes that "the statute did not deprive the
public of access to the drugs," because 100,000 people each month were still filing
7 8 Ibid., 597.
79 Ibid., 598.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 600.
83 Ibid., 601.
84 Ibid., 600.
8 5 Ibid., 601-602.
86Ibid., 603.
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prescriptions for Schedule II drugs before the District Court injunction.8 7 However,
the opinion does not specify how many people were deterred by privacy concerns.
According to the Court,"[u]nquestionably, some individuals' concern for their own
privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention." 8 8 Yet the
Court accepted this degree of lack of service and reasoned that this situation was
necessary for health care, along with other "unpleasant invasions of privacy" that
occur in "modern medical practice."8 9 Therefore, the Court held that the statute did
not violate the privacy rights of these people.
About computers and privacy in general, the Court wrote:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files.... The right to collect and use such data
for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory
or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.9 0
According to the Court, New York's statute met this duty under the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution. As a result, the Court declined to discuss either "un-
warranted disclosure" once it happened or systems "that did not contain comparable
security provisions" to those of New York's health department. 9 ' Alpert interprets
this suspension of judgment to mean that the "Court did not address whether the
compilation of the information was itself a violation of privacy."92 However, the Court
does address the issue of the compilation of medical information. According to the
Court, the disclosures required by the New York statute are not "meaningfully dis-
tinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated
with many facets of health care."93 The Court accepts invasions of this degree as
a necessary part of modern medicine, invasions which do not, in and of themselves,
violate constitutional rights:
8 7Ibid.
88 Ibid., 602.
89Ibid.
9 0Ibid., 605. Footnote omitted.
91 Ibid., 606.
92 Alpert, 19.
93 Whalen, 602.
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[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital per-
sonnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an
essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosures may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such dis-
closures to representatives of a State having responsibility for the health
of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.9 4
The Court did not address the issues of information systems with security procedures
different from those of the New York Department of Health or what should happen
if data were disclosed without good reason.9 5 However, the Court concluded that the
requirements of the New York statute, and by implication, current medical practices
in 1977, did not violate the Constitution.
2.3.7 Court Case #2: U.S. v. Westinghouse
U. S. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation96 was a case before the United States
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1980. It is a case which embodies the way the
law has attempted to balance various interests involved in medical privacy. The
director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) tried to
subpoena documents from an employer under the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(OSHA).9 7 NIOSH has authority by statute to "develop and establish recommended
occupational safety and health standards" 9 8 and "to conduct research concerning
occupational safety and health"9 9 This authorized research includes the ability "to
conduct a health hazard evaluation" of a workplace at the request of an employer or
employee representative.'° ° The director motioned to subpoena the documents to the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.'01
In 1978, a union representative at a Westinghouse plant in Pennsylvania requested
9 4Ibid. Footnote omitted.
9 5Ibid., 605-606.
96U.S. v. Westinghouse Electric Corpoiation, 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
9 7 Westinghouse, 570.
9 8Ibid., 572, quoting 29 U.S.C. §671(c)(1). Language from statute.
9 9Ibid., referring to 29 U.S.C. §671(c)(2), §669. Language from court opinion.
0O°Ibid.
0
°lIbid., 570.
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a NIOSH health hazard evaluation concerning alleged "allergic reactions" involved in
the manufacture of electric insulators. 10 2 In the course of the investigation, NIOSH
officials "requested access to the company's medical records of potentially affected
employees,"'l03 but Westinghouse officials said that they would only turn over the
records to NIOSH if the employees who were the subjects of the records gave "writ-
ten informed consent" 1' 04 and if the United States government gave Westinghouse
"written assurance... that the contents of these records will not be disclosed to third
parties."'l0 5 NIOSH went to district court to ask the court to subpoena the records
without Westinghouse's conditions.l0 6
Trial Court Decision At the trial, the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania "granted NIOSH's petition and ordered full enforcement
of the subpoena."' 0 7 Relying on Whalen v. Roe and another case, the district court
held that sufficient public interest in this case overrode the privacy interests of the
employees.'0 8 Westinghouse appealed.'0 9
Issue On Appeal Upon appeal the following issue arose:
* What factors should be considered when deciding if an invasion of privacy sur-
passes constitutional limits?
Appeals Court Decision and Reasoning The Court of Appeals judge, Sloviter
wrote the opinion for a three judge panel. l l ° The Third Circuit Court used the Whalen
definition of constitutionally protected privacy as "two types of privacy interests" 111:
"One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another
102Ibid., 572.
103Ibid.
104Ibid., 573. Westinghouse's words.
105 Ibid. Westinghouse's words.
1 0 6Ibid.
°
07Ibid. Citations omitted.
1 0 8 1bid.
109Ibid.
l°Ibid., 570, 572.
"'Ibid., 577.
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is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 112 Re-
garding medical records in particular, the court holds that "There can be no question
that an employees medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal
nature are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.""'l3 Fur-
thermore, in this case, the medical information sought by NIOSH was "more exten-
sive" and possibly "more revealing of intimate details" than the drug use information
involved in Whalen."4 However, the court holds that even information that is pro-
tected under the Constitution "must be produced or disclosed upon a showing of
proper government interest."1 l5 The court quotes the following text, cited earlier,
from Whalen:
[D]isclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital per-
sonnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an
essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclo-
sures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health
of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy.1l6
Thus the court recognizes that "the right of an individual to control his or her medical
history in not absolute." 1l 7 Rather, it is limited by the need of the government to
protect public health or other important interests. l8
Privacy Criteria In view of the contingent nature of medical privacy rights, trade-
offs involving these rights become very important to examine. What criteria should
be used to determine how much invasion of medical privacy is to be tolerated. The
Westinghouse court attempts to answer this question. Regarding trade-offs among
different interests the court writes: "In this case, we attempt to reconcile the privacy
interests of employees in their medical records with the significant public interest in
12Whalen 599-600. Quoted in Westinghouse, 577.
l ' 3Westinghouse, 577. Footnote omitted.
"4Ibid.
"5Ibid.
"
6 Whalen, 602. Quoted in Westinghouse, 578.
117Westinghouse, 578.
1 8 Ibid.
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research designed to improve occupational safety and health."1' 9 "Thus, as in most
other areas of the law," the court also comments, "we must engage in the delicate
task of weighing competing interests." 1 20 The court then gives its criteria for judging
medical privacy cases, "The factors which should be considered in deciding whether
an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are" the following:
* "the type of record requested,"
* "the information it does or might contain,"
* "the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure,"
* "the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was gener-
ated,"
* "the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,"
* "the degree of need for access,"
* "and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,
or other recognizable public interest militating toward access."' 21
As it applied these factors to the case, the court first reasoned that the Occu-
pational Health and Safety Act served the "comprehensive statutory scheme" which
established NIOSH for the purpose of protecting worker health. 122 This congressional
mandate to protect worker health, according to the court, "ranks with the other
public interests which have been found to justify intrusion into records normally
considered private." 123 Second, NIOSH was able to prove its need for the records it
requested, both in terms of its "authority" 124 to collect the information under NIOSH
regulations and in terms of the "relevance"'125 of the information to its investigation.
126 Third, with respect to the relationship between Westinghouse employees to the
19Ibid., 572.
12Ibid., 578.
121Ibid.
122Ibid.
123Ibid., 579.
124 Ibid., 575.
125Ibid.
126Ibid., 575, 579.
58
firm's doctors, the court reasons that Westinghouse did not sufficiently prove that
disclosure of the data in the records was sensitive enough to cause the employees to
suffer or cause them to not to receive future required examinations. 27 We notice that
the court, in accord with philosophical examinations of privacy, considered possible
"injury... to the relationship in which the record was generated." 128 Fourth, follow-
ing Whalen, which took into account the administration of "security provisions," 129
this court considered NIOSH's ability to maintain security, and agreed with the trial
court that this ability was sufficient.'30 Therefore, the court allowed NIOSH to receive
Westinghouse's employee records without any of Westinghouse's conditions.
Once it balanced the competing interests, the court took several measures to
protect the privacy of the workers who were the data subjects of the files.' 3' Despite
its judgment on the issue, the court admitted the possibility that some data in the
files might be so sensitive that they ought not be revealed to NIOSH:
We cannot assume that an employee's claim of privacy as to particular sen-
sitive data in that employee's file will always be outweighed by NIOSH's
need for such material. 132
As a result, the court required NIOSH to notify the affected employees and to permit
them to "raise a personal claim of privacy, if they desire."'133 Although the court
granted NIOSH standing to assert the privacy of its workers in this case,134 upon
deciding the case, it placed upon each individual worker the responsibility for asserting
his or her privacy rights.' 35 The court disposes of the collective claim and sets the
stage for the later judgments by the district court, using these criteria for balancing
interests at the individual level.136
127Ibid., 579.
128 Ibid., 578.
12 9 Whalen, 589.
1 3 0Westinghouse, 579-580.
131 Ibid., 580-581.
'
32Ibid., 581.
1 3 3 Ibid.
134Ibid., 574.
135Ibid., 581.
13 6 Ibid., 581-582.
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2.3.8 Implications of These Cases: Balance of Powers and
Balance of Interests
Notice that the Westinghouse court makes allowances for privacy interests to be
traded off against an "express statutory mandate," "articulated public policy," or
"other recognizable public interest." 137 This is not to say that the court unnecessar-
ily compromised privacy interests. It did not. However, it must be recognized that
the court properly recognized the limits of its own authority. This federal court did
not have the power to settle privacy issues for once and for all. In America, there is
rarely a final word in public policy, instead, there is continual dialogue in general, and
dialogue of particular authority and importance between courts and legislatures.1 3 8
The court recognizes that it cannot set the nation's priorities regarding privacy pro-
tection and thus leaves that decision in the hands of Congress. Of course, Congress
is limited by the Constitution as the federal courts interpret it. The role of Congress
is to set national priorities through the political process of negotiation, and the role
of the federal courts is, from outside of that process, to interpret the expressions of
those priorities as embodied in law and apply them to situations as they arise. Should
Congress disagree with either the courts' interpretations or its applications of its will,
Congress can reenter the political process of negotiation and issue a statute that is
either more explicit or different. This way of describing the two roles is an ideal,
and in practical terms, it is evident that there are gray areas where the two roles
overlap. In fact, Congress has some authority, under the Constitution, to structure
the federal court system and even to dictate the jurisdiction of federal courts.' 39 The
Circuit Court yielded to the requests of NIOSH because Congress had expressed a
mandate for occupational health, according to the Circuit Court's interpretation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The Circuit Court interpreted the
will of Congress in that document to be that the health of workers was an important
137 Ibid., 578.
13 8Many of the ideas in this paragraph, this one in particular, draw from Martha Derthick's MIT
class, "The Policy Making Process" (TPP 22).
139 Constitution, art. III, secs. 1-2.
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national priority, and thus the court included it in its balancing of interests. Regard-
ing health care, the importance of Congress becomes clear. If Congress establishes
aspects of the health care reform issue as national priorities, the federal courts using
the Westinghouse factors will consider them as an "express statutory mandate," "ar-
ticulated public policy," or "other recognizable public interest""'4 0 and balance them
with privacy considerations. Such priorities could include any of those discussed in
chapter 1: cost control, quality control, universal access (the solidarity principle), or
actuarial fairness. Moreover, just as Congress created NIOSH under OSHA to exe-
cute its will to protect occupational health, so may it also create executive agencies
to ensure various priorities in health care. These will be subject to the authority of
the President and the Executive Branch in matters of daily operation while bound
by the statutory mandate on more general issues. OSHA was the statutory mandate
of NIOSH, and its is possible that a new health care plan will serve as the statu-
tory mandate of new agencies, such as the National Health Board and other agencies
envisioned under the Clinton health plan.
14 0Westinghouse, 578.
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Chapter 3
Medical Privacy and Three Health
Care Reform Proposals
This work contends that present health care reform proposals must be modified in
order to protect medical privacy rights adequately. This chapter will examine this
hypothesis by looking at three health care reform bills proposed to Congress: first,
the plan created by the Clinton Administration and sponsored in the House by Rep.
Richard Gephardt (D-MO) and in the Senate by Sen. Mitchell (D-ME), called the Na-
tional Health Security Act (HSA);1 second, the Managed Competition Act (MCA),2
sponsored in the House by Rep. Jim Cooper (D-TN) and in the Senate by Sen.
Breaux (D-LA); and third, the Consumer Choice Health Security Act,3 sponsored in
the House by Rep. Stearns (R-FL) and in the Senate by Sen. Don Nickles (R-OK).4
The criteria used to evaluate to the proposals will be discussed. Then, a summary of
each proposed plan will be given, along with the privacy provisions in each plan and a
discussion of them. In the concluding chapter, chapter 4, the plans will be compared
'U.S. Congress, House, Health Security Act, 103rd Cong., 1st sees., H.R.3600, (1993). In the
Senate, S.1757. It has 100 co-sponsors in the House and 31 in the Senate.
2 U.S. Congress, House, Managed Competition Act of 1993, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., H.R.3222,
(1994). In the Senate, S.1579. It has 57 co-sponsors in the House and 4 in the Senate.
3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.,
S.1743, (1993). In the House, H.R.3698. It has 18 co-sponsors in the House and 25 in the Senate.
4Kaiser Foundation on the Future of Medicaid, "Summary of Major Health Care Reform Leg-
islation," Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, (Dec. 22, 1993). Except where noted otherwise, all of the
information in this paragraph comes from this source.
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for their protection of privacy.
3.1 Evaluation Criteria
3.1.1 National Scope
As discussed in chapter 1, one of the primary motivations for federal action in the
area of medical privacy is to create a policy that is national in scope. The major
problem in present medical privacy law is its lack of uniformity through the nation.
Health care involves a significant portion of the American economy around one sev-
enth of the Gross Domestic Product. Medicine and insurance are both businesses of
at least regional (interstate) scope. Therefore, regulation of these industries should
occur at the national level. More than likely, any congressional action, by its nature,
will be national in scope. However, at a deeper level, the effectiveness of congressional
action depends on how it is implemented. Although congressional action creates na-
tional policy in theory, the execution of this policy may differ over various regions.
It is important that Congress ensure that its actions regarding medical privacy have
adequate funding, especially if states are involved in the administration. State in-
volvement is likely to occur because states are presently involved in Medicare and
Medicaid, and their involvement is being discussed in various health plans. This is
not unusual. However, because it is also not unusual for states to differ in their eco-
nomic resources or their administrative mechanisms, Congress must pay attention to
the issue of implementation.
3.1.2 The "Fair Information Practices"
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Advisory Committee
on Automated Personal Data Systems released a report on computers and privacy,
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens. That report outlined a set of "fair
information practices" to serve as general federal privacy policy. 5 These principles
5 Gostin et al., 2490.
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can be applied to medical privacy. The following are the fair information practices:
* "There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret."
* "There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him
is in a record and how it is used."
* "There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent."
* "There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identi-
fiable information about him."
* "Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their in-
tended use and must take reasonable precaution to prevent misuse of the data." 6
According to Gostin et al., these principles "have enduring importance for the devel-
opment of a uniform federal privacy."7 According to Alpert, these Fair Information
Practices were incorporated into the 1974 Privacy Act, which applied them only to
the federal government and "state and local government record systems using the
Social Security Number," not to private firms or other local or state agencies.8
3.1.3 The Gostin Group's Five Recommendations
Lawrence Gostin, editor of the "Law and Medicine" section of the Journal of the
American Medical Association and a member of the President's Task Force on Na-
tional Health Care Reform, worked together with five other leaders in the area of
medical privacy rights, including scholars from Georgetown University and The Johns
Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, and officials from the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), to produce an article on that subject for the Journal of the
6 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records, Computers, and the Rights of
Citizens (Washington [DC]: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 41.
7 Gostin et al., 2490.
8 Alpert, 19-20.
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American Medical Association. Lawrence Gostin and his colleagues developed the
following five recommendations for health information privacy in a reformed health
care system:
1. "Establish, Through Preemptive Federal Legislation, National Privacy Safe-
guards Based on Fair Information Practices."
2. "Establish a System of Universal Identifiers for the Health Care System."
3. "Issue Effective Security Standards and Guidance for Health Care Information."
4. "Establish a Data Protection and Security Panel(s) as Part of the National
Health Board for Overseeing Privacy and Security."
5. "Establish a Comprehensive Program Fostering Privacy and Security Education
and Awareness."9
All of these recommendations are useful in increasing medical privacy protection
at the national level. Although all of these recommendations are valid and important,
for the purpose of evaluating the three health care bills, recommendations 1, 2, and 4
are the most important. The first one is especially important because the diverse state
laws on medical privacy have become outmoded. l ° A unified approach is necessary.
In addition to using these criteria for evaluating the bills, I will also use the degree
of specificity of the implementation measures suggested in both the Gostin group's
article, as well as the measures described in Sheri Alpert's article.
3.1.4 The Gostin Group's Three Goals
According to Gostin and his colleagues, the information policies in a new health care
system should have three goals: data integrity, data availability, and privacy of data." l
1. It should "ensure... the integrity of health care data so that information is
accurate, complete, and trustworthy."' 12
9 Gostin et al., 2492.
10 lbid.
1 lIbid., 2487.
12Ibid.
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2. It should "ensure... the availability of health data so that authorized persons
who need the information for legitimate health purposes have ready access to
the data." 1 3
3. It should "ensure... the privacy of patients so that they can be assured that
personal information remains private and will not be disclosed without their
knowledge and permission."1 4
These criteria balance some of the interests discussed earlier. Integrity helps all in-
terests. It makes sure that patients receive proper care. It helps doctors do their
job well and avoid malpractice suits. It helps researchers develop sound conclusions.
Integrity also helps health care providers, insurance companies, and government agen-
cies in determining both quality and cost-effectiveness. Availability helps health care
providers, insurance companies, and government agencies in a similar way by mak-
ing their jobs proceed more efficiently. Privacy, as discussed earlier, mainly helps
consumers protect their own interests.
These three criteria are valuable because they place privacy in the context of the
factors against which it must be balanced. Privacy is very important, and it must
be protected. However, because it is so important it is easy to make the mistake
of viewing privacy as an absolute right, one that can never be compromised to any
degree. A more realistic view of privacy insists upon a strong degree of privacy
protection with some degree of allowances given to other legitimate interests. The
Gostin group's criteria maintain such a realistic view. Once it is determined that
privacy must be protected while leaving other interests intact to some degree, the
difficult question is: "How much?" or rather, "To what degree should privacy be
protected?" The Gostin group's criteria do not directly specify an answer to this, nor
does the present work fully answer that question. However, this is a question that can
probably only be settled by negotiation among the affected parties. Even so, both
Gostin's criteria and the judgments of the present work hope to move toward such a
resolution.
1 3 Ibid.
14Ibid.
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3.2 Democrats, Reform, and Privacy
Two of the health care reform proposals we will examine are sponsored by Democrats.
Health care reform was a major issue in President Clinton's 1992 presidential cam-
paign.15 Privacy and health care reform will be interesting to look at through Demo-
cratic eyes because, at first glance, it would seem that this issue would cause the
collision of two Democratic values: individual autonomy and government assistance.
3.3 The Clinton Plan
The President's health care plan, sponsored by Rep. Gephardt, is officially called the
National Health Security Act of 1993.16
3.3.1 Summary of the Clinton Health Care Plan
Managed Competition The central concept behind the Clinton health plan is
"managed competition." Managed competition is an experimental attempt to com-
bine the power of governmental regulation with the flexibility of private profit motives.
"Managed" means that the government will attempt to use the nation's health re-
sources in a more cost-effective manner. In addition, the government will change the
distribution of health benefits in such a way as to provide them to all citizens. "Com-
petition" means that the government will try to build a system where doctors compete
to provide medical benefits at the lowest possible cost. Should managed competition
fail, the Clinton plan includes provisions for strong government regulation to achieve
the same goals.1 7
Health Alliances Health alliances will serve as the representatives of consumers
in the plan. According to the HSA, "the term 'regional alliance' means a non-profit
5Stone, "Struggle," 303.
16U.S. Congress, House, Health Security Act, 103rd Cong., 1st sees., HR 3600, (1993). In the
Senate, S 1757. From here on I will abbreviate the name of this bill with the acronym "HSA"
'
7 Tom Morganthau and Mary Hager, "The Clinton Cure," Newsweek, Oct. 4, 1993, 37-39.
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organization, an independent state agency, or an agency of the State which" repre-
sents the health needs of a large group of citizens.' 8 According to Newsweek, "The
health alliances would be quasi-governmental bodies created by the states-large or-
ganizations that would represent consumers in a given region."'19 The goal of health
alliances is to unify a large number of consumers in order to give them "more bargain-
ing power and more expertise in selecting health-care coverage."20 In addition, the
health alliances would provide a large pool for the spreading of risk. Almost everyone
would be in a health alliance because only corporations with over 5,000 employees
would be allowed the choice of forming their own groups. 21
Health Plans On the other hand, health plans are groups of providers. The term
"health plan" is defined in the Act.22 Health plans provide the adversary to health
alliances in the negotiation process. According to Newsweek, "plans could be formed
by doctors, hospitals, insurance companies or any combination of the three." 23 Thus,
the Clinton health plan would institutionalize and accelerate the present trend in
medicine away from independent practitioners who charge for each service they pro-
vide (fee-for-service medicine) toward consolidated groups of doctors, called health-
maintenance organizations (HMOs) which provide a complete health package at a
fixed price.24 This systemic change would change the incentives for doctors to pro-
vide procedures.25 Every year, health plans would bargain with health alliances to
provide at least the amount of service included in a uniform package of benefits, as
defined by the government.2 6
18HSA §1301
9 Morganthau and Hager, 39.
2 0Ibid.
2 1 Ibid.
22 HSA §1400
23 Morganthau and Hager, 39.
24 Ibid.
2 5 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 39, 43.
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Assumption of Waste Elimination A major assumption of the Clinton health
care proposal is that there is enough waste that can be eliminated to pay for universal
coverage. 27
Regulatory Measures Should managed competition fail, the Clinton health plan
would allow the federal government to intervene in the negotiation between health al-
liances and health plans. One mechanism for intervention would be setting a national
budget for health care with cost controls that become more strict over time.2 8
National Health Board The primary body which would be created to administer
the Clinton health plan would be the National Health Board.29 The National Health
Board would be "composed of 7 members appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate."3 0 They would serve as full-time officers.31
Each member serves for a 4-year term with a possible one term renewal.3 2 The chair,
however, has a term concurrent with the president's and can serve up to three 4-year
terms. 3 3
3.3.2 Privacy and the Clinton Plan
By its nature, the Clinton health plan entails considerations of privacy. The plan
hopes to create a program to provide health care to every citizen. Because the gov-
ernment must keep track of how each citizen uses health benefits, this plan necessitates
an increased government role in the lives of citizens. The two sides of the National
Health Security Card, an important symbol of President Clinton's reform effort,34
shows both sides of this dilemma. On the front of the card will be a person's name,
27 Ibid., 37.
2 8Ibid.
29 HSA Title 1, Subtitle F, Part 1
3 0HSA §1501(b)
31 HSA §1502(c)
32 HSA §1501(d)
33 HSA §1501(c)
3 4Maureen Dowd, "Clinton's Health Plan: Reporter's Notebook; Props and Fuzzy Anecdotes in
a Sober, Grown-Up Talk," New York Times, Sep. 23, 1993, sec.A, p.1, and Toner, "Pledging Peace
of Mind," 1.
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a "tangible symbol" that he or she will be able to have reliable health care.35 On the
other side of the card will be a magnetic stripe, or possibly some other technology
which will enable the government to keep track of the program.3 6
Privacy is specified as a goal of the Act: "The Congress finds as follows ... (2)
Under any reform of the health care system ... (L) an individual's medical information
should remain confidential and should be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
use." 37
Health Information System and Electronic Data Network President Clinton
hopes that his plan will simplify insurance claims processes and reduce medical cost
through the use of the Health Security Card and the national medical database:
"Freeing the health care providers from these costly and unnecessary paperwork and
administrative decisions will save tens of billions of dollars." 38 VWithin two years after
the passage of the Clinton plan, the National Health Board must "development and
implement a health information system by which the Board shall collect, report, and
regulate the collection and dissemination of the health care information...." 39 Both
the regional alliances and the health plans must comply with privacy regulations
promulgated by the National Health Board.40 The National Health Board is also
responsible for establishing an "electronic data network consisting of regional centers
that collect, compile, and transmit information" as part of this national information
system.4 '
Privacy Standards The bill defines individually identifiable information as infor-
mation easily associated with the enrollee relating to "the past, present, or future
3 5 Robert Pear, "Clinton Medical Plan Calls for 'Health Security' Cards," New York Times, Apr.
10, 1993, sec.1, p.7.
3 6 Seth Neubardt, "How to Put Single Payer in Clinton Health Plan; Magnetic Medical File," New
York Times, Oct. 5, 1993, sec.A, p.26.
37 HSA §2
38President, "Clinton's Health Plan; Transcript of the President's Address to Congress on Health
Care," New York Times, Sep. 23, 1993, sec.A, p.24. This statement agrees with the $36 billion of
savings projected by Arthur D. Little, Inc. Arthur D. Little, 2. See section 1.3.6 on page 15 above.
39 HSA §5101(a)
40 HSA §1327, §1413, §1503(e)
41 HSA §5103(a)
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physical or mental health of the enrollee... the provision of health care to the en-
rollee; or... payment for the provision of health care to the enrollee."4 2 An "enrollee"
is anyone covered under a health plan. The disclosure of individually identifiable
information must be authorized by the data subject, except in the following two
cases:
(C) the disclosure is to Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies
for the purpose of enforcing this Act.. .or
(D) the disclosure otherwise is consistent with this Act and specific criteria
governing disclosure established by the Board.4 3
Some of these criteria depend on the actions of the future Board, but what does the
rest of the bill allow? In order to protect privacy, the Clinton plan offers the following
principle:
Minimal disclosure. All disclosures of individually identifiable health
information shall be restricted to the minimum amount of information
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the information is being
disclosed. 44
I will call this the "minimal disclosure principle" of the Clinton plan. McCaughey
calls this "vagueness" and "double talk."4 5 The problem with this provision is that
"the purpose for which the information is being disclosed" could be defined in almost
any way. However, the bill explicitly forbids health plans from supplying alliances
with individually identifiable information "for the purpose of setting premiums based
on risk adjustment factors"4 6 or the use of individually identifiable information "in
making employment decisions."4 7
Consumer Rights The Clinton plan also offers the following governing principles
as the rights of data subjects:
42 HSA §5123(3)
43HSA §5120(c)(1)
4 4HSA §5120(c)(2)
4 5 Elizabeth McCaughey, "She's Baaack!" New Republic (Feb. 21, 1994): sec.A, p.18, and "Price
Controls on Health Care," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 22, 1993, sec.A, p.14.
46 HSA §5120(c)(3)
4 7HSA §5120(c)(9)
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* Right to know. An enrollee... has the right to know... whether any
individual or entity uses or maintains individually identifiable health
information concerning the enrollee; and... for what purposes the
information may be used or maintained."
* Right to access. Subject to appropriate procedures, an enrollee... has
the right, with respect to individually identifiable health information
concerning the enrollee that is recorded in any form or medium... to
see such information... to copy such information... to have a nota-
tion made with or in such information requested by the enrollee...
* Right to notice. An enrollee and an enrollee representative have
the right to receive a written statement concerning... the purposes
for which individually identifiable health information provided to a
health care provider, a health plan, a regional alliance, a corporate
alliance, or the National Health Board may be used or disclosed by,
or disclosed to any individual or entity; [and] the right of access
described [above].48
The bill also requires the National Health Board to submit a legislative proposal to
Congress for "a comprehensive scheme of Federal privacy protection for individually
identifiable health information" within three years after the plan's passage.4 9 This
proposal must give a "Code of Fair Information Practices" to inform citizens of their
rights. 5 0
The National Health Security Card The health alliances issue the health secu-
rity card: "A regional alliance is responsible for the issuance of health security cards
to regional alliance eligible individuals ... , Both health alliances52 and health
plans53 face privacy requirements in the Act.
Smart Cards "Smart cards" are a new technology which enable a normal identifi-
cation card to carry much more information than before. A magnetic stripe, like those
on the back of credit cards, can hold half of a page of information, but a smart card
can hold thirty pages of information by using memory chips and a microprocessor.
4 8 HSA §5120(c)
4 9 HSA §5122(a)
5 0HSA §5122(b)
5 1HSA §1324
5 2HSA §1327
53 HSA §1413
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In France, the smart card is already being used for pay phones and bank cards and is
beginning to be used in medicine.54 Furthermore, another current technology is the
optical card. By using the same technology as compact disk players, optical cards
can hold up to 2,000 pages of information or even a few digital images. Optical card
systems are already being installed for libraries in Ontario. 55
Should a smart card be used as the national health security card? The president
cannot guarantee whether or nor a smart card will be used once the plan goes to
Congress and then, if passed, to administrative agencies. In fact, the legislation of
Clinton's plan does not specifically forbid this. The HSA leaves this to the discretion
of the National Health Board: "The National Health Board shall establish standards
respecting the form of health security cards and the information to be encoded in
electronic form on the cards."5 6 In the past President Clinton planned to use smart
card technology: "During the campaign, candidate Clinton said, 'Everyone will carry
a smart card, encoded with his or her personal medical information."' 57
The HSA gives discretion to the National Health Board to determine the in-
formation kept on the card: "The National Health Board shall establish standards
respecting ... the information to be encoded in electronic form on the cards. Such
information shall include [identity of the citizen, that person's health plan and poli-
cies] and any other information that the National Health Board determines to be
necessary in order for the card to serve the purpose described [earlier in the Act]."58
The use of the Health Security card outside of medical contexts is forbidden in the
HSA: "A health security card ... may be used ... in accordance with the regulations
promulgated by the [National Health] Board, only for the purpose of providing or
assisting the eligible individual in obtaining an item or service that is covered under
[the programs permitted by the Act]."5 9
54 William M. Bulkeley, "Technology-Information Age: Get Ready for 'Smart Cards' in Health
Care," Wall Street Journal, May 3, 1993, sec.B, p.11.
5 5 Ibid.
56 HSA §5105 (b)
57 Bulkeley, "Get Ready," 11.
58 HSA §5105(b)
59 HSA §5105(a)
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Clinton Plan The main strengths of the
Clinton plan are its specificity. Even so, it still has problems with vagueness both in
its minimal disclosure principle and its treatment of the health security card.
3.4 The Cooper Plan
The health plan sponsored by Representative Cooper is officially called the "Managed
Competition Act of 1993."'6o
3.4.1 Summary of the Cooper Plan
The Cooper plan makes voluntary coverage available to everyone not under Medicare
through group private insurance.6 ' The cooperative groups are administered by the
states and organized into regional pools, similar to the alliances of the Clinton plan.6 2
The Cooper plan gives the title "Health Plan Purchasing Cooperatives," or "HPPCs,"
to these "not-for-profit corporations." 63 With the exception of possible interstate
areas, each state will serve as one HPPC.64 The health care industry is represented in
the plan by "accountable health plans" or "AHPs."6 5 These are providers of health
benefits who make agreements with their customers.66 The Cooper plan is financed
by individual contributions and voluntary contributions from employers, along with
state and federal subsidies for small businesses and people with low incomes.67
The Health Care Standards Commission Like the Clinton plan's National
Health Board, the Cooper plan establishes an executive agency called the Health
60U.S. Congress, House, Managed Competition Act of 1993, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., HR 3222,
(1994), §1. In the Senate, S.1579. From this point on, I will abbreviate this bill with the acronym
"MCA"
61Kaiser
62Ibid.
63 MCA §1101(b)(1)
6 4 MCA §1101(a)(1)
65 MCA §1201, §1701(b)(1)
66 MCA §1701(b)(1), §1701(c)(1)
67 Kaiser
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Care Standards Commission in order to administer the program.6 8 Health plans be-
come "accountable" when they register with this organization.6 9 The Commission
features "5 members appointed by the President by and with advice and consent of
the Senate"70 for terms of seven years.7 There is a chairman, and all the members
serve full-time.72 This commission is responsible for setting the "Uniform Set of Ef-
fective Benefits," the treatments permitted under the plan.7 3 This commission is also
responsible for establishing information standards which "protects the confidentiality
of individual enrollee." 74
3.4.2 Privacy and the Cooper Plan
Cost Savings through Information Technology According to information from
Rep. Cooper's office, reducing paperwork in the insurance industry could save "[at
least $5 billion in annual health care expenditures."7 5 The Cooper plan hopes to
achieve these savings through "standard claims forms and electronic transmission of
data."7 6 Given the estimates of the Arthur D. Little study-savings of $36 billion
annually 77- the estimate of the Cooper staff seems to be well within the realm of
possibility.
National Health Data System The Cooper plan also involves a national data
system.78 The Cooper plan requires the accountable health plans (AHPs) to sub-
mit to the Commission and its regional cooperative (HPPC) "such information as
the Commission determines to be necessary."79 This information must include the
6 8MCA §1301
69 MCA §1201(a)
70 MCA §1301(a)(1)
71 MCA §1301(a)(3)
72 MCA §1301(a)
73 MCA §1302
74 MCA §1307, §6002
75 Information from Rep. Cooper's Office. U.S. Representative, Jim Cooper, Staff Office, "The
Managed Competition Act of 1993: A Summary of H.R. 3222," 5.
76 Ibid.
7 7 Arthur D. Little, 2. See section 1.3.6 on page 15 above.
7 8MCA §1307
79 MCA §1203(a)(1)
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following:
(A) Information on the characteristics of enrollees that may affect their
need for or use of health services and the determination of risk adjustment
factors for enrollee units.
(B) Information on the types of treatments and outcomes of treatments
with respect to the clinical health, functional status, and well being of
enrollees.
(C) Information on health care expenditures, volume and prices of pro-
cedures. 80
The act makes payment of providers contingent upon their submission of this infor-
mation, except in the case of emergency services.81
Role of the Commission Similar to the Clinton plan, the Cooper bill gives the
responsibility for medical privacy standards to the Health Care Standards Commis-
sion. There are two sets of privacy standards, one for information provided by health
plans and one dealing specifically with individually identifiable information.
The Health Care Standards Commission must promulgate standards for the in-
formation from health plans.8 2 Regarding the level of privacy in these standards, the
Cooper plan states:
The standards shall be established in a manner that protects the confi-
dentiality of individual enrollees, but may provide for the disclosure of
information which discloses particular providers within an AHP."83
In addition to these standards, the Commission is responsible to issue and modify
specific standards regarding individually identifiable information:
The Health Care Standards Commission shall promulgate, and may mod-
ify from time to time, requirements to facilitate and ensure the uniform,
confidential treatment of individually identifiable health care information
in electronic environments.84
8 0MCA §1203
81 MCA §1203(b)
82 MCA §1307
8 3MCA §1307(a)(2)
8 4MCA §6002(a)(1)
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The Commission must issue these standards within six months of the passage of
the bill.8 5 These standards must apply to individually identifiable information at any
stage of its existence (its collection, handling, storage, and all disclosures).86 State and
federal public health reporting is exempt from them.8 7 Special protections must be
given for "highly sensitive data," such as mental health or drug abuse information).88
Under the bill, these medical privacy standards must "require publication of the
existence of health care data banks"89 and "provide for the deletion of information
that is no longer needed to carry out the purpose for which it was collected."90 States
with privacy standards already consistent with those of the Commission are exempt
from the Commission's standards. 9 1 Violations of these privacy standards, under the
Cooper plan, will result in civil damages, in accordance with the regulations of the
Commission. 92
Fair Information Practices The Commission's privacy standards must also in-
clude "fair information practices that assure a proper balance between required dis-
closures and use of data."9 3 Criteria for this balance include the following:
(i) creating a proper balance between what an individual is expected to
divulge to a record-keeping organization and what the individual seeks in
return,
(ii) minimizing the extent to which information concerning an individual
is itself a source of unfairness in any decision made on the basis of such
information, and
(iii) creating and defining obligations respecting the uses and disclosures
that will be made of recorded information about and individual;94
85 MCA §6002(4)
86 MCA §6002(2)(B)
87 MCA §6002(2)(C)
88 MCA §6002(2)(G)
89 MCA §6002(F)
90 MCA §6002(I)
91 MCA §6002(b)(1)
92 MCA §6002(d)
93 MCA §6002(2)(E)
94 MCA §6002(2)(E)
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3.5 Republicans, Reform, and Privacy
The Nickles plan will be interesting to examine because it is an example of a large
scale reform plan from someone in the Republican party. Many Republicans have
denied the existence of a health care "crisis" in order not to give into the assump-
tions that President Clinton and other Democrats have used in shaping the reform
debate.9 5 Typically, Republicans oppose large scale bureaucracy and heavy govern-
ment intervention with the private market. Using superficial stereotypes, it would
also seem that Republicans would focus more on the negative effects of government
than the Democrats.
According to an article by Ruth Shalit in The New Republic, the dominant Repub-
lican position on health care reform is that there is no "crisis" and that only minor
changes are necessary.9 6 She writes:
The line is now monolithic and simple: there is no health crisis; no cov-
erage problems; no cost increase spiral; no need to do anything drastic at
all. 97
This position was inspired by a memo written by William Kristol of Project for the
Republican Future, and, according to Shalit, between December 1993, when the memo
was written, and February 1994, Republicans moved towards his position.98
However, the simplicity of the Republican line that Shalit's article paints can
be questioned. Shalit's article mentions two Republican Senators who are sponsoring
major measures in health care reform. At least two Republican Senators, John Chafee
and Don Nickles have sponsored large scale health care reform bills.9 9 The Chafee
plan, is, in Shalit's view, "the most comprehensive of the Republican health care
plans,"'100 had "some twenty co-sponsors" including Minority Leader Bob Dole, said
Chafee in February 1994.101 The Nickles plan has 25 co-sponsors, also including Dole,
9 5 Ruth Shalit, "The Wimp-Out," The New Republic (Feb. 14, 1994): 19.
96 Ibid.
9 7 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99Ibid., 22.
0O°Ibid.
01Quoted in Shalit, 22.
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according to information from Nickles's office.1'0 2
3.6 The Nickles Plan
The official name of the plan that Senator Nickles is sponsoring is the Consumer
Choice Health Security Act of 1993.1°3
3.6.1 Summary of the Nickles Plan
The Nickles plan is one of the Republican proposals for major health care reform.'04 It
uses the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan as its model.1'0 5 The plan requires
those not under Medicare to buy private health insurance.10 6 It is financed with
general revenues, reductions in Medicaid and Medicare, individual premiums, but
subsidies are given to those with low incomes.l'0 7
3.6.2 Privacy and the Nickles Plan
Cost Savings through Administrative Standardization According to mate-
rial from Nickles's office, under the CCHSA "[t]he Secretary of Health and Human
Services would have the power to require all health care providers to submit claims
to health insurance companies in accordance with the Secretary, if providers are not
voluntarily complying with the standards. The Secretary is also directed to adopt
standards relating to data elements for use in paper- and electronic-claims processing
of health insurance claims, uniform claims forms and uniform electronic transmission
of data." 108
102Information from Sen. Nickles's Office. U.S. Senator, Don Nickles, "Fact Sheet: S.1743: Con-
sumer Choice Health Security Act," (Nov. 20, 1993)
103 U.S. Congress, Senate, Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., S
1743, (1993), §1. In the House, HR 3698. The number of the bill in the House is H.R.3698 and in
the Senate is S.1743. From this point on, I will abbreviate this bill with the acronym "CCHSA."
'
0 4Shalit, 22.
'
0 5U.S. Senator, Don Nickles, "A Health Plan Good Enough for Senators," Wall Street Journal
(Nov. 16, 1993): sec.A, p.22.
°
0 6Kaiser
107 Ibid.
°'Nickles Staff Office, 6
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The CCHSA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to adopt two
sets of standards regarding electronic medical information. The first set of stan-
dards concerns the administrative side of medicine: "claims processing," "utilization
review," and "management of care."l0 9 The other set of standards concern the tech-
nical side of medicine.
Data Standards for Administration The CCHSA requires the Secretary to
"adopt standards relating to... Data elements for use in paper and electronic claims
processing," "Uniform claims forms," and "Uniform electronic transmission of the
data elements."'l l° According to the CCHSA, the electronic transmission standards
"shall include protections to assure the confidentiality of patient-specific informa-
tion and to protect against the unauthorized use and disclosure of information.""'
Though this language is not very specific, the CCHSA requires the HHS Secretary
to incorporate the recommendations of recent task forces on the subject, such as the
Workgroup on Electronic Data Interchange (WEDI) and the Computer-based Patient
Record Institute (CPRI) and to consult American National Standards Institute. 112
These electronic transmission standards must be promulgated within two years after
passage of the act, for "hospital and physician services" and later for "transmission
of information on other services." 113
Data Standards for Providers The Nickles plan requires the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate another set of standards
"for hospitals concerning electronic medical data.""'l4 This is to occur "Between July
1, 1995 and January 1, 1996." 'll5 These standards will define a "set of comprehen-
sive data elements" which includes a standard data set for "quality control peer re-
'
0 9CCHSA §401(a)(1)
I°CCHSA §401(a)(1), Nickles Staff Office 1993: 6
l"lCCHSA §401(a)
12CCHSA §401(b)
113 CCHSA §401(c)(3)
l14 CCHSA §411(a)
"
5 CCHSA §411(1)
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view organizations." 116 Regarding the privacy of this data, the CCHSA also requires
"Standards for an electronic patient care information system with data obtained at
the point of care." 117 These standards must contain provisions "to protect against the
unauthorized use and disclosure of information."l' 8 In addition, the Secretary must
promulgate standards for the transmission of hospital data and for the "confidential-
ity of patient-specific information.""' 9 Under the CCHSA, the HHS Secretary can,
at his discretion, impose standards similar to these "concerning electronic medical
data for providers that are not hospitals."1 20 Once the comprehensive data set for
hospitals is established, an insurer cannot require any additional data or violate the
transmission standards for that data. 12 1 Civil penalties accompany such violations of
the standards. 122
Medicare and Veterans Administration Requirements In order for a hospi-
tal to participate in either Medicare or Veterans Administration programs, it must
maintain the required data sets on its patients and provide these to the Department
of Health and Human Services or organizations with which it has contracted for the
purpose of quality control or fiscal management.123 This requirement can be waived
under certain circumstances. 124 In general, when federal agencies receive data from
hospitals, the agencies can require the hospitals to meet the same standards that
apply in other cases.125
The Purpose of the Following Chapter The purpose of this chapter was to
examine the privacy provisions of the three reform bills. Chapter 4 will offer further
evaluations of the bills and recommendations for medical privacu reform.
1 16CCHSA §411(b)
"
7 CCHSA §411(b)(3)
1 18 CCHSA §411(b)(3)
1 19 CCHSA §411(b)
12 CCHSA §411(c)
121 CCHSA §414(a)
122 CCHSA §414(b)
123 CCHSA §412
124 CCHSA §412
125 CCHSA §413
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and
Recommendations for Medical
Privacy Reform
The original hypothesis holds, that although each of the three health care reform
proposals takes steps to protect medical privacy, none of them do as much as should
be done to protect the medical privacy of citizens. This work recommends four actions
to Congress for improving upon the privacy protection provisions of these three bills:
1. Congress should take legislative action now to protect medical privacy, rather
than delaying it by leaving it exclusively in the hands of administrative agencies.
2. This legislative action must more directly specify details of policy implementa-
tion than the provisions in these three bills.
3. Congress should place the administrative authority for medical privacy regu-
lations in the hands of a presently existing agency in order to speed up the
implementation of medical privacy standards.
4. Congress should work to ensure vigorous implementation of its policies through
the states.
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4.1 Recommendation #1: Present Congressional
Action Is Needed
4.1.1 Present versus Future Action
The medical privacy problem is one that already exists. It is best to deal with it right
now, at the same time that health care reform is dealt with.
4.1.2 Legislative versus Other Types of Action
Although the Clinton plan delays substantial action for the longest period of time, one
strength of the Clinton plan is that it keeps privacy standards tied to Congress. The
Clinton plan requires its National Health Board, within three years, to submit com-
prehensive medical privacy legislation to Congress. This allows approval of medical
privacy standards to occur within Congress rather than an administrative agency.
4.2 Recommendation #2: Specific Proposals Are
Needed
One problem with the privacy provisions of all three proposals is their vagueness.
However, although it has its own problems with vagueness, as mentioned above, the
privacy protections of the Clinton plan are the most specific, mainly because of the
three consumer rights that it explicitly mentions (right to know, right to access, and
right to notice). There are at least two major problems of vagueness in the privacy
provisions of the Clinton plan. First, the restrictions of Clinton's plan regarding the
health security card are not able to specifically govern whether or not smart cards
will be used as the national health security card. The National Health Board has the
power to shape information technology in this area. Second, the minimal disclosure
principle is so vague to be almost meaningless.
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4.3 Recommendation #3: An Existing Agency
Should Have Authority
In one sense, the Nickles plan is better than the other two, because it places the
authority to create privacy regulations in the hands of an existing administrative
agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It already has its own
policies and standards which have weathered the political process and gained some
kind of consensus approval. If a new agency were created, the entire structure of the
agency would be developed in the same political environment that created health care
reform. This could take a long time because of the present lack of consensus regarding
health care reform. Using an existing agency would also require less congressional
action. Congress could issue specific details of policy implementation regarding the
issues of medical privacy, rather than initiating an entirely new administrative process.
On the other hand, it could be objected that newly created agencies could have greater
expertise in the emerging field of information technology and privacy as well as a more
fair representation of the affected interests. However, an existing agency, like HHS,
could hire or contract with experts and also set up negotiation procedures to give a
fair voice to all of the relevant interests. On the whole, it is more stable to use an
existing agency to create privacy regulations.
4.4 Recommendation #4: Vigorous State Imple-
mentation Is Necessary
One of the major problems in the present U.S. policy toward medical privacy is lack
of uniformity. Congressional action is one step in solving this problem. However, it
is not enough. Congress must ensure the effective implementation of the policies it
creates in this area. This involves two things: money and mechanisms. Congress must
make sure that the programs it creates have enough money to work vigorously. This
is a particular problem if its programs will be administered in any way by the states.
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States often execute federal programs with differing degrees of effectiveness because
of the differing resources or their differing priorities in the use of those resources.
Furthermore, different states have different administrative mechanisms. Congress
must ensure that these mechanisms satisfy standards high enough to achieve its policy
goals.
4.5 Conclusion
This work argues that the following proposition is true: "Present medical privacy
proposals must be revised in order to protect medical privacy adequately." This
conclusion is only an inductive one, not a deductive one, because three proposals do
not constitute a sample that is statistically valid. Nor are the three proposals an
exhaustive set of the existing health reforms in Congress. In fact, in its "Summary
of Major Health Care Reform Legislation," dated December 22, 1993, the Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation examines six proposals, only three of which this work has
discussed.' However, these three include the President's plan, which has received the
most attention of any other plan; the Cooper plan, which is a main competitor of the
President's plan; and the Nickles plan, one of the major Republican measures. The
argument of this work is that if these three important health care reform proposals do
not take measures of adequate strength to protect medical privacy, it is probable that
the issue is not receiving enough attention in Congress or even in the public at large.
Further work should examine specific initiatives to deal with the issue of medical
privacy alone, such as Rep. Gary Condit's "Fair Health Information Practices Act of
1994" (H.R.4077).2 It will also be important to observe the ability of measures such
as this one to be integrated, as Condit hopes his will be, into the text of whatever
health care reform plan emerges from Congress.3
On the whole, the privacy provisions of the Clinton plan are superior to those of
1 Kaiser
2 Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, "Rep. Condit Introduces Fair Health
Information Practices Act," (Mar. 18, 1994). News release written by Bob Gellman.
3Ibid.
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the Cooper plan. However, all three plans are much too vague when compared to
the recommendations of the Gostin group, Sheri Alpert, or even the Fair Information
practices written by the Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1973. For
example, HEW's practices says, "There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available
for other purposes without his consent." None of the three proposals deal with this
issue, except for the Clinton plan's prohibition on the use of the health security card
for non-health purposes. Likewise, the HEW practices state, "There must be a way
for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and how it
is used." Only the Clinton plan mentions this. Of the three proposals, the Clinton
plan gives the greatest degree of specificity.
In all fairness, it appears that all three bills are concerned with the issue of privacy.
All three bills explicitly deal with the issue. It seems that all three bills depend heavily
upon administrative agencies to fill in the details of privacy protection. However, all
three rely upon later actions to produce privacy standards rather than including them
explicitly in the legislation. It is possible that each plan delayed dealing with privacy
more specifically because their authors were more concerned with getting health re-
form measure passed. This is understandable because privacy policy is generally less
controversial than the issues of health care reform in general. However, as chapter
1 showed, the issues of health care reform involve privacy and cannot be separated
from it. Therefore privacy decisions should be made at the same time as decisions on
more general issues.
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